Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act by Hoffman, Allison K.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2011 
Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
Allison K. Hoffman 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Health Economics Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Health Policy Commons, 
Insurance Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Policy Design, 
Analysis, and Evaluation Commons 
Repository Citation 
Hoffman, Allison K., "Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act" (2011). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1878. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1878 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
HOFFMAN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011 2:04 PM 
 
(1873) 
ARTICLE 
THREE MODELS OF HEALTH INSURANCE:   
THE CONCEPTUAL PLURALISM OF  
THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND  
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
ALLISON K. HOFFMAN †
What risks should health insurance mitigate?  American health scholars, 
politicians, and the public at large answer this question ambivalently.  This 
Article defines three dominant conceptions of health insurance that weave 
throughout popular and academic discourse and that echoed in the 2010 
health reform debates.  The first conception is that health insurance should 
primarily serve to mitigate harms to health.  This “Health Promotion” theory 
relies on using health insurance to pay for medical care that most cost-effectively 
preserves and improves health.  Alternately, health insurance might primarily 
mitigate risks to wealth from high medical care costs.  This “Financial Security” 
theory demands that health insurance limit financial insecurity from these 
costs.  Finally, the “Brute Luck” theory, highly sensitive to the possibility of  
adverse-incentive effects arising from moral hazard, demands that health in-
surance protect primarily against unavoidable or “chance” health risks that do 
not arise from individual behavior.  This last theory thus seeks to preserve in-
centives for insureds to prevent risk themselves, while insurance neutralizes 
harms from random poor health.  Each theory implies distinct principles to 
guide premium pricing and allocation of premium dollars toward medical care. 
 
 
† Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.  Many thanks for thoughtful 
comments and conversations to Tom Baker, Asli Bâli, I. Glenn Cohen, Sung Hui Kim, 
Russell Korobkin, Ted Marmor, Jon Michaels, Jennifer Mnookin, Amy Monahan, Ab-
igail Moncrieff, Hiroshi Motomura, Bill Sage, Vicki Schultz, Joanna Schwartz, Kathy 
Stone, Steve Yeazell, Noah Zatz, and Fred Zimmerman.  Thanks to Eli Tomar for excel-
lent research assistance and to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review editors for pa-
tiently navigating the minutiae of PPACA.  Special gratitude to Sam Krasnow. 
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The new health reform law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
of 2010 (PPACA), manifests this “conceptual pluralism.”  It evokes all three of 
these notions of the types of risks Americans should share—now more collectively 
post-reform—through insurance.  While the goals of these three theories dovetail 
at times (e.g., promoting health will in some cases also reduce medical care 
costs), at other times they are at odds.  Conceptual pluralism thus complicates 
implementation of PPACA as regulators must manage tensions and make  
tradeoffs among these goals. 
The framework offered in this Article is important for two reasons.  First, 
creating a roadmap to understand the different conceptions of insurance, and 
the values that inform them, brings awareness to the root cause of tensions that 
will arise as PPACA is implemented.  Second, this framework elucidates the dif-
ferent ends that health insurance could serve and thus enables clearer future 
reflection and debate on what ends it should serve and to what degree. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Health insurance has become a regular topic of dinner-table and 
watercooler conversations with the recent passage of a national health 
insurance reform law—the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 
and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 20102
Americans simultaneously hold several conceptions about what 
health insurance is (and often, impliedly, should be).  Some think 
health insurance should pay for care to maintain our health.  Others 
see it as a tool to protect us against medical bankruptcy or other types 
of financial insecurity that arise from expensive and rising medical care 
costs.  Finally, others think it should indemnify costs we cannot reason-
ably prevent on our own—unavoidable risks.  Some think insurance 
should serve two or three of these goals simultaneously.  Yet, each of 
these three conceptions implies a distinct starting point for determin-
ing what health insurance should accomplish and for whom. 
 (collec-
tively referred to herein as “PPACA”).  But when Americans talk about 
health insurance, they are not all talking about the same thing. 
This Article draws on scholarly, political, and popular discourse 
on insurance to define what I contend are the three dominant Ameri-
can conceptions of health insurance.3
PPACA has shone a light on medically related risks and how we 
manage them.  The law amplifies the importance of collective risk 
management through health insurance as described in Part I.  This 
Part reviews how PPACA increases the extent to which health insur-
ance redistributes risk.  For example, the law requires Americans to 
  The ideas and arguments un-
derlying these three distinct (yet overlapping) models of health insur-
ance have for years colored discussions of health insurance, most 
recently woven throughout health reform debates, but this Article is 
the first to untangle and explore them systematically.  By making ex-
plicit this conceptual pluralism, this Article elucidates normative un-
derpinnings of health insurance debates, as well as the root causes of 
tensions that will arise as PPACA is implemented. 
 
1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).  
2 Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified in scattered sections of 20, 26, 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 Although the main text of this Article refers to PPACA and HCERA collectively as 
“PPACA,” the footnotes cite the two Acts separately.    
3 There are undoubtedly other conceptions as well, but I see these three as the 
most strongly and frequently evoked. 
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carry health insurance,4 increasing the population who will engage in 
collective risk management.  It also requires private health insurance 
to be more “solidaristic,” characterized by broader sharing of risks 
among rich and poor, and among healthy and sick (what I have pre-
viously described as “health redistribution”5).6
In Part II, I examine the three theories in depth, including argu-
ments in support of each theory and different ways that the values be-
hind these theories might be translated into practice.  The first theory 
is that health insurance should promote health.
  However, it does not 
privilege a singular conception of the risks Americans must share, now 
more collectively, through mandatory health insurance.  Rather, the 
law mirrors normative values underlying all three dominant American 
conceptions of health insurance. 
7
 
4 PPACA § 1501, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West Supp. 1A 2010).  
  Insurance dollars 
5 Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water:  Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, 
and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 11 (2010).  This article contends that an individual 
mandate in conjunction with insurance-market reforms that require greater risk pooling 
can promote greater solidarity through “health redistribution,” or a pooling of risks 
among healthy and sick.  Id. 
6 For a discussion of solidarity and PPACA, see Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, 
and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 
(2011).  “The Affordable Care Act embodies a social contract of health care solidarity 
through private ownership, markets, choice, and individual responsibility.”  Id. at 1579.   
7 This idea has been advanced and described by scholars in several ways.  First, 
some advocate the importance of medical care and the role of insurance in ensuring 
access to care.  See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care?  The Eff-
ect of the Health Care System on the Health of America, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 9-10 (1994) 
(arguing that “promotion of the health of the population is the most important objec-
tive of health care reform” and that access to medical care is a critical—though not the 
sole—component of promoting health); Ronald R. Loeppke, Making the Case for Popu-
lation Health Management:  The Business Value of Better Health (“Health plans’ specific re-
sponsibilities include improving the health of the members . . . .”), in POPULATION 
HEALTH 121, 130 (David B. Nash et al. eds., 2011); Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform:  
What’s Insurance Got to Do with It?  Recognizing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of In-
surance, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 436, 450 (2010) (“A more transparent approach to reform 
would make explicit that health plans constitute a valuable, separate species of insur-
ance designed primarily to finance socially beneficial health services by spreading the 
cost of care.”); John A. Nyman, The Value of Health Insurance:  The Access Motive, 18 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 141, 142 (1999) (“Additional benefits are derived from insurance’s 
ability to make available medical care that would not otherwise be affordable.”).  Many 
make a related argument that the lack of insurance or insufficient insurance leads to 
poorer health.  See, e.g., COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INST. OF 
MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST:  UNINSURANCE IN AMERICA 4 
(2003) (estimating that “the aggregate, annualized cost of the diminished health and 
shorter life spans of Americans who lack health insurance is between $65 and $130 bil-
lion annually for each year of health insurance foregone” (emphasis omitted)); Jona-
than Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, J. ECON. LITERATURE 571, 582-83 
(2008) (citing studies demonstrating the adverse impact of the lack of insurance on 
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are most valuable, according to this notion, if spent on interventions 
that cost-effectively maintain or improve health.  Core characteristics 
of insurance from this perspective include prioritized spending on 
high-value care, defined as care that produces the most health benefit 
per dollar spent, and less spending on what are generally considered 
lower-value interventions, such as high-end diagnostics and, often, 
end-of-life care.8  This “Health Promotion” paradigm of health insur-
ance is reflected in the work of scholars such as Larry Gostin who 
think about health insurance in connection with broader public 
health goals (e.g., education, nutrition, and housing), or those, such 
as Michael Chernew, Donald Berwick, and Michael Porter, who think 
about improving the value of health care through organizational de-
sign.9
 
health); Jack Hadley, Sicker and Poorer:  The Consequences of Being Uninsured, MED. CARE 
RES. & REV., 3S, 60S (2003) (“[T]here is a substantial body of research supporting the 
hypothes[i]s that having health insurance improves health . . . .”); Shana Alex Lavarreda 
et al., Underinsurance in the United States:  An Interaction of Costs to Consumers, Benefit Design, 
and Access to Care, 32 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 471, 480 (2011) (arguing that “along with 
the accepted frameworks for defining underinsurance in economic terms or as a func-
tion of lacking needed benefits, the effect of underinsurance on access to care should be 
considered as well”); Diane Rowland & Adele Shartzer, America’s Uninsured:  The Statistics 
and Back Story, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 618, 618 (2008) (“The large and growing number 
of uninsured people is of concern because health coverage makes a difference in wheth-
er and when people get necessary medical care, where they get their care, and ultimately 
how healthy people are.”).  Finally, the idea that health insurance should be designed 
with health promotion as the primary goal is often implied by arguments for value-
oriented health care design.  See, e.g., MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH OLMSTED TEIS-
BERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE 229 (2006) (“Health plans must become health organi-
zations, not just insurance organizations.”); Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim:  
Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759, 760 (2008) (arguing that “the United States 
will not achieve high-value health care unless improvement initiatives pursue a broader 
system of linked goals,” including “improving the health of populations”); Michael E. 
Chernew et al., Value-Based Insurance Design, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 30, 2007, at W195, W202, 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/2/w195.full.pdf (arguing that value-based 
insurance design could “align[] . . . incentives based on overall value of clinical ser-
vices, not just cost” and could therefore help “move toward a high-value health care 
system for all”).  
  Key PPACA policies could be understood to reflect this concep-
tion of health insurance.  For example, the law prohibits insurers from 
charging copayments for preventive care, under the presumption that 
8 See e.g., Robert H. Blank, Regulatory Rationing:  A Solution to Health Care Resource 
Allocation, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1573, 1579 (1992) (“We have developed an unrealistic 
dependence on technology to fix our health problems at the expense of preventive 
health care approaches.”); Katherine Swartz, Uninsured in America:  New Realities, New 
Risks (“Slowing growth in health care spending ultimately will not be possible unless 
the basic benefits package excludes treatments that are enormously expensive and not 
cost-effective.”), in HEALTH AT RISK:  AMERICA’S AILING HEALTH SYSTEM—AND HOW TO 
HEAL IT 32, 56 (Jacob S. Hacker ed., 2008).   
9 See supra note 7. 
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such care is relatively high value, so that every American can seek out 
basic preventive services without paying a dollar of her own money, re-
gardless of individual ability to pay.10  In so doing, it creates a strong in-
centive for every American to consume preventive care, with the goal 
that such care will improve health and quality of life, even if it does not 
save money in the long run.11  This theory also undergirds investment in 
comparative effectiveness research, which aims to identify the relative 
value of heath care interventions.12
The second theory is that health insurance should first and fore-
most mitigate financial vulnerability arising from health care spend-
ing.  Professors Jerry Mashaw and Michael Graetz, for example, have 
embraced this “Financial Security” notion of health insurance in their 
book True Security.
 
13  This theory is also echoed in recent literature on 
underinsurance, health expenditures, and medical bankruptcy by Ja-
cob Hacker, Melissa Jacoby, David Himmelstein, Elizabeth Warren, 
Deborah Thorne, and Steffie Woolhandler, among others, who critic-
ize insurance for not providing sufficient financial protection.14  This 
approach prioritizes indemnifying medical expenses that significantly 
threaten financial stability.15
 
10 PPACA sec. 1001, § 2713, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
  Key policies of PPACA are designed with 
11 One can question whether preventive care will actually achieve such a goal.  
Whether this policy is well crafted or not is distinct from the point that it is included in 
PPACA based on a belief that it can improve health. 
12 PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 6301–6302, 124 Stat. 119, 727-47 (2010) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
13 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY 146 (1999) (“[I]t is 
the job of social insurance to protect family income streams . . . .”). 
14 See JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 138 (2006) (“Every thirty seconds, 
someone files a bankruptcy claim that’s due in part to medical costs . . . .”); Jacob S. 
Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare State:  The Hidden Politics of Social 
Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243 (2004) (arguing that 
the convergence of stagnant policies and changing social realities has left Americans 
more financially vulnerable); David U. Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contri-
butors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2005, at W5-63, W5-72, http:// 
content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/02/02/hlthaff.w5.63.full.pdf+html [he-
reinafter Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury] (noting that “middle-class Ameri-
cans . . . face impoverishment following a serious illness”); David U. Himmelstein et al., 
Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007:  Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 
741, 743 (2009) [hereinafter Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy] (finding that medi-
cal bills contribute to many bankruptcies); Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing 
Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 239, 240, 286 
(2010) (claiming that the court-record method, which involves looking at the court doc-
uments submitted by bankruptcy filers, “is an unreliable measure of the financial burden 
of illness or injury faced by bankruptcy filers” and underrepresents the actual hardship).  
15 Cf. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 13, at 171 (discussing how medical expenses 
should be limited to protect patients’ standard of living).   
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such a goal in mind.  For example, the law caps possible out-of-pocket 
cost-sharing obligations for all policies.16  It also provides subsidies 
that prevent insureds from paying more than a certain percentage of 
their income toward premiums and cost-sharing obligations.17
The third and final theory is that health insurance—in the classic 
image of liability insurance
 
18—should protect primarily against those 
risks an insured should not reasonably avoid on her own, including 
risks whose avoidance would be unduly expensive or burdensome.  
This “Brute Luck” approach to health insurance is justified in two dif-
ferent ways.19  First, some “luck egalitarians” demand heightened at-
tention to neutralizing suffering from unavoidable harms.20  Others, 
including Kenneth Abraham and Mark Pauly, argue that such an ap-
proach will promote more efficient risk avoidance or limit moral ha-
zard.21
 
16 PPACA § 1302(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(c) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
  This particularly American notion requires those who assume 
a higher risk of poor health to pay more for protection against the 
harms and costs that may ensue.  In contrast, insureds who prevent 
such risks through healthy lifestyles (e.g., eschewing smoking and fast 
17 PPACA § 1401, 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West Supp. 1A 2010) (providing for “pre-
mium tax credits”); id. § 1402, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071 (West Supp. 1B 2010) (providing 
for “cost-sharing reductions”). 
18 According to Eric Mills Holmes, 
[T]he earliest definition of insurance drew upon the fortuity principle and 
created a test to define insurance based on control (not fortuitous) or the lack 
of control (fortuitous) over the insured loss by the insured or insurer.  This 
notion of control gave rise to the use of a “substantial control” test by anyone 
attempting to determine if a particular business was the “business of insur-
ance” or a particular transaction constitutes “insurance.”   
16 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 116.2 (2d ed. 2000).   
19 As Part II will discuss, there are two main lines of argument for this theory.  First, 
insurance can reduce incentives for individuals to care for themselves or to prevent 
health harms, a particular type of moral hazard; thus, insurance should cover only ran-
dom risks to maintain incentives for risk avoidance.  See, e.g., KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRI-
BUTING RISK 35-36 (1986) (discussing how moral hazard concerns have influenced insur-
ance policy and pricing practices over time); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral 
Hazard:  Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 537 (1968) (“[E]ven if all individuals are risk-
averters, some uncertain medical care expenses will not and should not be insured in an 
optimal situation.”).  But cf. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK 128 (2007) 
(discussing an experiment that “found absolutely no evidence of ex ante moral hazard—
that people engaged in more risky behaviors because they faced lower cost sharing” (cit-
ing JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP, FREE FOR ALL?  LESSONS 
FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 200-01, 208 (1993))).  Second, some 
advance a luck-egalitarian argument for a theory of distributive justice that requires neu-
tralizing unavoidable harms.  See infra notes 228-32.  
20 For a discussion of luck egalitarianism, see infra Section II.C.   
21 For examples of Abraham’s and Pauly’s arguments, see supra note 19.  
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food) and cautious living (e.g., limited skydiving or helicopter-skiing 
adventures) pay less.  In the same way that home insurance will not 
compensate for damages caused by a fire that the homeowner inten-
tionally sets or the way that life insurance policies might exclude sui-
cide within a period after the policy is initiated,22
While parts of PPACA mute the Brute Luck conception of insur-
ance, several key policies could be understood to reflect it.  PPACA 
prohibits insurers from discriminating against applicants on the basis 
of most health conditions but allows them to discriminate in cases in 
which insureds have arguably either assumed or, inversely, prevented 
risks.  For example, insurers can charge smokers more for health in-
surance.
 health insurance 
might not reimburse harms that are self-inflicted, negligently induced, 
or avoidable.  The primary role of insurance becomes the mitigation 
of chance harms, or those harms resulting in whole or in part from so-
called brute bad luck or lottery with regard to health.  Of course, dis-
tinguishing choice from chance is complex and controversial, as ex-
plored below in Section II.C. 
23  They can also provide wellness-program discounts to 
people who, presumably, are responsibly preventing health risks 
through such programs. 24
I simplify these three theories of health insurance for purposes of 
developing a coherent framework, but, as I describe each theory, I si-
multaneously acknowledge and tease out its internal tensions.  For ex-
ample, a Health Promotion model requires identifying what types of 
harms to health insurance should protect against and for whom.  But 
promoting health means different things to different people, depend-
ing on which particular health outcome they most value.  Likewise, 
implementing a Financial Security model requires defining what con-
stitutes financial security; supporters of this approach define security—
and thus the ideal boundaries of health insurance coverage—
differently.  Adherents to a Brute Luck approach likely disagree as to 
what are reasonably avoidable risks versus unavoidable chance risks.  
In Part II, I attempt to show the main thread of logic that defines the 
 
 
22 HOLMES, supra note 18, § 116.2 (describing the role of the fortuity principle in 
insurance). 
23 See PPACA sec. 1201, § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iv) 
(West Supp. 1A 2010) (allowing premiums to vary by no more than 1.5 to 1 based on 
“tobacco use”). 
24 Id. sec. 1201, § 2705(j), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4( j).  Such programs can simulta-
neously promote health if effective.   
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models, while recognizing that different strands of interpretation 
weave out in different directions from the main thread. 
This framework aims to shed light on the interactions and, at 
times, conflicts between these different conceptions of health insur-
ance.  These three conceptions of health insurance are overlapping 
and certainly not mutually exclusive.  These conceptions sometimes 
coexist harmoniously, when policies satisfy goals in line with multiple 
visions.  At other times, however, they come into conflict.  Each theory 
implies a different starting point for thinking about insurance and dis-
tinctive criteria for prioritizing which risks are most important to redi-
stribute through insurance (and, perhaps, which risks should fall out-
side the bounds of collectivization).  In the extreme, imagine if health 
insurance policies covered only one of the following items: 
1. Recommended colon cancer screenings to promote early detection 
for a man in a middle-class family who lives a healthy, low-risk lifestyle; 
2. Medical care for an obese man with diabetes who otherwise faces poten-
tial bankruptcy because of his high medical care costs related to his obesity; 
3. Coverage of the costs of breast reconstruction surgery for a forty-year-
old corporate attorney with breast cancer, who has a type of cancer that 
suggests a genetic predisposition. 
Colon cancer screenings are an element of long-term health pro-
motion for the healthy man, although low-cost enough that he could 
likely afford the screenings even if not covered by insurance.  Insur-
ance coverage for the diabetes care could save the obese man from fi-
nancial ruin resulting from the high expense of treating a serious 
chronic condition, despite the fact that some might argue he assumed 
the risk of such expense by becoming and remaining obese and thus 
is less deserving of rescue now.  Finally, the lawyer could afford breast 
reconstruction without insurance (though at great personal expense), 
but because she suffers from cancer due in part, or whole, to her ge-
netics, insurance could neutralize her bad genetic luck.  All of these 
medical interventions are valuable in different ways, and, in an ideal 
world, some might want health insurance to pay for all three.  But if 
tradeoffs were necessary, some would prioritize insurance coverage for 
the first, others the second, and yet others the third, depending in 
part on their view of the most important function of health insurance. 
To be clear, this Article does not intend to resolve tensions among 
these different normative approaches to health insurance.25
 
25 Philosophers and scholars have long debated the best way to allocate and fund 
medical care, a question that is complex, heated, and impossible to resolve in the 
  Nor does 
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it intend to suggest that this conceptual pluralism—and its reflection 
in PPACA—is surprising or undesirable.  Legislators and policy-
makers, like any other Americans, had aspects of these three concep-
tions in mind as they crafted PPACA.26  Furthermore, pluralism is not 
uncommon in legislation and is especially unsurprising in the case of 
PPACA, given an ambivalent electorate, the divisive political process 
that led to passage of the law, and significant compromise over many 
months.27
This Article intends to make conceptual pluralism explicit so that it 
is clear when policies are informed by a particular set of values and when 
tradeoffs are made among these three visions of insurance.  Even if plu-
ralism was necessary for enactment, PPACA’s pluralistic nature will com-
plicate its implementation.  When translated into policy, the three prin-
ciples will at times conflict, creating discordance among PPACA policies. 
  If the legislation had failed to appeal to a majority coali-
tion—a majority that does not share any single conception of what 
health insurance should do—it would not have passed.  In other 
words, if, as I contend, Americans expect different ends from health 
insurance, then health insurance reform was destined to reflect plura-
listic visions of insurance in order to prevail. 
With no single normative roadmap, regulators must wrestle with 
these three conceptions of insurance when defining PPACA policies 
in regulations (whether they do so consciously or not).  PPACA leaves 
many of the most important policy-design elements to regulatory spe-
cification, and the regulatory process is already proving to be a chal-
 
bounds of this Article.  For a summary review of these debates, see NORMAN DANIELS, 
JUST HEALTH:  MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 11-28 (2008).  See also Einer Elhauge, 
Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1496 (1994) (“Once we abandon 
a commitment to fund every health benefit possibly achievable, we face difficult choic-
es about which health improvements to fund out of a limited set of resources.”); Go-
vind Persad et al., Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions, 373 LANCET 423, 
424 tbl.1 (2009) (listing eight principles of allocating health care and the advantages 
and disadvantages associated with each).   
26 See quotations introducing Sections A, B, and C of Part II. 
27 See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND AMERI-
CAN POLITICS 11-16 (2010) (providing a timeline of the major events from March 2007 to 
March 2010 resulting in the passage of the health care reform bill); see also THEODORE R. 
MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 43-61 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the machinations 
and compromises leading to the passage of the Medicare bill); DEBORAH STONE, POLICY 
PARADOX (rev. ed. 2002) (illustrating the contradictions throughout American politics 
and policymaking); Rudolf Klein & Theodore R. Marmor, Reflections on Policy Analysis:  
Putting It Together Again (describing public policy as an elusive creature, “resolving (or at 
least attenuating) conflicts about resources, rights, and morals”), in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 892, 892 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006).   
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lenge.28  The implementation of key insurance regulations, such as the 
medical loss ratio,29 “essential health benefits,”30 and processes for 
oversight of insurance premium increases, will differ depending upon 
which conception of health insurance dominates.31
By understanding these three dominant American theories of 
health insurance and the tensions they create among various provi-
sions of PPACA, regulators can more thoughtfully address these ten-
sions as they arise.  Furthermore, Americans can better understand 
the tradeoffs regulators and policymakers must make among these 
conceptions of insurance in the creation and implementation of 
health insurance policies. 
 
I.  HEALTH INSURANCE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF RISK, AND  
ENHANCED SOLIDARITY UNDER PPACA 
Before describing these three different conceptions of health in-
surance, it is important to consider briefly how health insurance—
particularly private insurance, the focus of this Article—manages and 
redistributes risks, as well as how it will increasingly do so following 
PPACA’s reforms.  As PPACA amplifies redistribution, it enhances the 
importance of what risks are distributed and among whom. 
Even in its least distributive forms, insurance facilitates two differ-
ent types of distribution of risks:  intertemporal and interpersonal.32
 
28 See Eric Lichtblau & Robert Pear, Rule Makers Emerge from the Shadows, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A28 (describing the rulemaking challenges that recent “mega-
bills” like PPACA pose).   
  
Intertemporal distribution is the spreading of risks faced by one indi-
vidual over a lifetime (i.e., consumption smoothing).  In this regard, 
insurance can been seen as a mechanism either to save for future 
losses through premiums paid today or to borrow for today’s expenses 
29 See PPACA secs. 1001, 10101, § 2718(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A) 
(requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to determine through 
regulations how to implement the medical loss ratio requirement that insurers spend 
80% to 85% of premiums on medical care).  
30 See PPACA § 1302, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West Supp. 1B 2010) (requiring the Sec-
retary of HHS to define through regulations which “essential health benefits” nongrand-
fathered health plans in the individual and small-group markets must cover). 
31 See infra Part III. 
32 While some believe that an efficient insurance market could eliminate inter-
personal redistribution by charging each individual a perfectly actuarially rated pre-
mium (defined as the exact amount the individual is likely to consume in health care 
costs over the coverage period), the reality is that even in the most “efficient” of insur-
ance markets, there is both intertemporal and interpersonal redistribution.  ABRAHAM, 
supra note 19, at 77. 
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by paying premiums for years to come.  Insurance also spreads risks 
interpersonally across individuals in a risk class—in other words, a 
pool designed for sharing risks (i.e., risk pooling).  Risks are pooled 
more broadly both when the boundaries of a risk pool are larger and 
when insurance coverage and prices are more similar among the in-
sured in a pool (e.g., when prices and coverage are not tailored based 
on an individual’s risk). 
The degree to which an insured shares risk with others in her risk 
pool has historically differed based on the source of her insurance.33  
American health insurance is bifurcated into public insurance (e.g., 
Medicare and Medicaid) and private insurance.  Private health insur-
ance was the source of insurance for about 195 million Americans in 
2009 prior to PPACA,34 and it will be the source for even more follow-
ing PPACA’s reform.35  Private health insurance is offered in three 
markets:  large group (over 50 or 100 employees depending on the 
state), small group, and individual.36  While all three markets facilitate 
both intertemporal and interpersonal redistribution of risks, the large-
group market has historically distributed risks more completely than 
the small-group and, especially, the individual market.37  Most private 
health insurance is large-group, employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), 
which employers may, but are not required to, offer to employees or 
retirees.38
 
33 See Hoffman, supra note 
  Employers gather heterogeneous groups of employees to-
gether as a risk pool, and, because of the nondiscrimination require-
ments of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
5, at 50-52 (describing how greater fragmentation of 
markets leads to less sharing of risks). 
34 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULA-
TION REPORTS, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  2009, at 71 tbl.C-1 (2010).  In addition, in 2009, just over ninety-three million 
Americans had public health insurance, in the form of Medicare, Medicaid, or military 
health care.  Id.  For a critical description of this federal “patchwork of health-care 
programs,” see TOM DASCHLE WITH SCOTT S. GREENBERGER & JEANNE M. LAMBREW, 
CRITICAL:   WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THE HEALTH CARE CRISIS 29-31 (2008).   
35 See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, 
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 9-10 (Mar. 20, 2010), available at http:// 
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf (projecting the extent to 
which PPACA and HCERA together would increase private health insurance coverage). 
36 See Mark A. Hall, The Geography of Health Insurance Regulation:  A Guide to Identifying, 
Exploiting, and Policing Market Boundaries, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2000, at 173, 173-75 
(illustrating how the lines between these markets are fluid due to “‘border-crossing’ 
structures and techniques”).   
37 See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 50-51.  
38 See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 34, at 71 tbl.C-1 (showing that nearly 170 
million of the nearly 195 million privately insured individuals have ESI). 
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1996 (HIPAA), such employers must offer insurance on the same 
terms to all employees, thus spreading risks equally among all mem-
bers of a risk pool.39  For group insurance, HIPAA also limited exclu-
sion of coverage for preexisting conditions40 and required insurers to 
issue coverage to any applicant (a policy known as “guaranteed is-
sue”).41
Prior to PPACA, the individual market, where people who gener-
ally do not have access to ESI buy insurance directly from an insurer, 
was less effective at risk distribution.  Insurers in most states’ individu-
al markets could issue, decline, or differentially price insurance based 
on an individual’s prior health experience or expected risk—a prac-
tice known as underwriting or “risk rating.”
  This requirement means that every employee can get cover-
age for any condition included under an employer’s policy. 
42  This practice limited 
both who could gain entry to risk pools and the degree of distribution 
of risks for those who did.43  Commercial insurers in the individual 
market aim to charge premiums based on an individual’s expected 
losses plus a share of administrative costs—a process which, if done 
precisely, would limit interpersonal risk distribution because each in-
dividual would pay her expected share of the pool’s total costs.44
 
39 See 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (“[p]rohibiting discrimination 
against individual participants and beneficiaries based on health status”).  While the 
terms might be facially neutral, however, employers could still carve out whole catego-
ries of treatment in a way that might have a disparate impact on employees.  See, e.g., 
McGann v. H&H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403, 408 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an 
employer who reduced the medical benefits for employees with AIDS did not discri-
minate illegally).      
  Stu-
40 29 U.S.C.A. § 1181 (West Supp. 1A 2010).   
41 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 300gg-1 note (West Supp. 1A 2010)). 
42 For a description of risk rating, see generally Donald W. Light, The Practice and 
Ethics of Risk-Rated Health Insurance, 267 JAMA 2503 (1992).  Some states limit exper-
ience rating.  See discussion infra note 44. 
43 See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 53-55. 
44 Both actuarial and regulatory limitations prevent perfect precision.  See ABRA-
HAM, supra note 19, at 77 (“Insureds are unlikely to suffer the exact amount of their 
expected losses over the course of their insuring lives.”).  Insurers do not define risk 
classes as narrowly as actuarily possible.  At some point the administrative costs of de-
fining classes narrowly enough to cabin redistribution and attract low-risk enrollees 
exceeds the benefit from enrolling additional subscribers.  Furthermore, even if prof-
itable, it is presently impossible to gauge individual risk perfectly.  Expected risk is only 
really defined once people are grouped with others so that group probabilities can be 
calculated, which by definition means the costs of losses will be spread among the risk 
group, however defined.  Id. at 79.  Finally, both federal and state regulations have limited 
insurers’ freedom to decline applicants or charge them differentially on the basis of health 
or other characteristics.  For example, according to Kaiser Family Foundation research, 
about a third of the states have community rating or rate bands that limit the variance in 
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dies suggest that as many as three in five individual-market applicants 
were either declined or priced out of coverage in the individual mar-
ket as a result of these underwriting practices.45
PPACA erases these differences among insurance markets, as it 
amplifies the significance of health insurance as a tool to distribute 
risk.
 
46  It does so in two major ways.  First, arguably its primary goal—
and certainly the most scrutinized—is to insure many of the fifty mil-
lion47 uninsured Americans so that they are included in risk pools.  To 
achieve this goal, PPACA expands public insurance and also reforms 
private health insurance markets to make insurance more affordable 
and accessible in several ways.  Most obviously, it requires people to 
carry insurance and thus participate in risk pools through the so-
called “individual mandate,”48 which spurred challenges to the 
reform’s constitutionality.49  It simultaneously attempts to improve 
access to insurance by requiring insurers in the individual market to 
issue policies to all applicants,50 requiring many employers to contri-
bute to employee coverage or else pay a penalty,51
 
rates that insurers can charge.  The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Individual Market Rate 
Restrictions (Not Applicable to HIPAA Eligible Individuals), 2010, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG (da-
ta as of Jan. 2010), http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=354&cat=7; see 
also discussion infra note 
 creating state-based 
“exchanges” to facilitate the sale of insurance to individuals and small 
255 and accompanying text. 
45 See SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PUB. NO. 953, 
SQUEEZED:  WHY RISING EXPOSURE TO HEALTH CARE COSTS THREATENS THE HEALTH 
AND FINANCIAL WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 4 (2006), available at http:// 
www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Fund-Reports/2006/Sep/Squeezed-
-Why-Rising-Exposure-to-Health-Care-Costs-Threatens-the-Health-and-Financial-Well-
Being-of.aspx. 
46 See generally Baker, supra note 6 (describing how PPACA affects risk distribution 
in both public and private insurance).   
47 See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 34, at 71 tbl.C-1 (reporting more than fifty 
million uninsured Americans in 2009). 
48 PPACA § 1501, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
49 The mandate is being challenged in a number of federal courts.  As of the com-
pletion of this Article, five such courts have issued opinions.  Three district courts have 
found PPACA constitutional.  See Mead v. Holder, No. 10-0950, 2011 WL 611139 
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-0015, 2010 WL 4860299 
(W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010); see also Kevin Sack, A Third Judge Validates Health Care Overhaul Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, at A14, available at 2011 WLNR 3539819 (discussing the litiga-
tion).   Two district courts have held PPACA unconstitutional.  See Florida ex rel. Bondi 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 
31, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).       
50 PPACA sec. 1201, § 2702, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1. 
51 Id. § 1513, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H. 
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groups,52 and, for lower-income individuals who do not have access to 
affordable employer coverage, providing subsidies for purchase of in-
surance on the individual market.53
Second, PPACA also reforms the individual and small-group mar-
kets so that once people are in risk pools, they share risk more evenly, 
in a manner more like in the large-group markets prior to reform.  
PPACA extends many of the rules HIPAA applied in group markets to 
the individual market in order to increase risk pooling.  PPACA limits 
the factors insurers can consider in risk rating.
 
54  In addition, all in-
surers in a state are required to treat all applicants in the individual 
market as a single risk pool.55  Finally, PPACA requires risk-adjustment 
and reinsurance mechanisms to compensate insurers for writing poli-
cies for higher-risk or more costly individuals56
The result of this private-market reform under PPACA is increased 
interpersonal distribution of risks within private insurance markets, 
facilitating what I have discussed in prior work as a more solidaristic 
health insurance system.
—practices that are tan-
tamount to facilitating risk-spreading among different insurers’ pools. 
57  A solidaristic system is one in which risks 
are pooled equally and broadly among healthy and sick insureds, re-
sulting in “health redistribution,” where the healthy help to shoulder 
the burden of medical care costs for the sick.58
 
52 By January 1, 2014, each state is required to establish an “exchange” to facilitate 
the purchase of insurance by individuals and small groups.  Id. § 1311(b), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18031(b) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
  Thus, a key goal of 
PPACA is to reshape insurance markets to enable—and in fact re-
53 Id. § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West  Supp. 1A 2010).  With these subsidies, as 
well as the public insurance reforms that are largely beyond the scope of this Article, 
what is at stake is not just private insurance and cross-subsidization within a risk pool, 
but also the use of tax dollars and other revenue to subsidize insurance for lower-
income Americans.  The distinction between risk-sharing (or cross-subsidization) with-
in insurance pools and subsidization of risk from external sources, such as taxpayers, 
raises questions about whether Americans are willing to share some risks with those in 
their risk pool that they are not willing to subsidize for the poor.  The sociological and 
political questions that this distinction raises are good fodder for future examination 
but are mostly beyond the scope of this Article.   
54 See id. sec. 1201, § 2704, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4.   
55 Id. § 1312(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(c) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
56 Id. §§ 1341–1343, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 18061–18063. 
57 The beginnings of private health insurance in the United States were built on a 
solidarity model.  Blue Cross plans exemplified the initial private nonprofit health in-
surance model, and those plans were community rated so that all insureds in a com-
munity paid the same price for coverage and thus shared risks.  See Hoffman, supra 
note 5, at 49-51 (discussing these solidaristic roots, their normative bases, and their 
institutional construction). 
58 Id. at 11-12.   
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quire—that risks be spread more solidaristically among insureds.  
PPACA amplifies the importance of the risks that health insurance 
collectively manages, as it reifies a pluralistic conception of these risks. 
II.  THREE CONCEPTIONS OF HEALTH INSURANCE 
Each of the three dominant American conceptions, or theories, of 
health insurance has a different vision of which types of risks should be 
collectively mitigated through the mechanism of insurance.  Each 
theory of health insurance prioritizes mitigating a different type of risk.  
The first theory posits that the primary goal of health insurance is to 
mitigate the risk of harms to health; insurance design prioritizes fund-
ing care—both preventive and remedial—to maintain or promote 
health.59  I call this the “Health Promotion” theory of health insurance.  
The second theory posits that the primary goal of health insurance is to 
mitigate harms to wealth; that is, insurance should be designed in a way 
that medical costs are covered when they threaten financial security.60  I 
call this theory the “Financial Security” theory of health insurance.  
The third theory posits that health insurance should prioritize cover-
age of medical costs that result from unavoidable harms, which are 
more the result of bad brute luck than of individual behavior.61
This Part describes these three theories and then shows how key 
policies of PPACA reflect each.  The ideas underlying these three 
theories were at the core of the debates leading up to the passage of 
PPACA.  The quotations introducing the Sections below show both 
the prominence of these ideas in the debates and the ways in which 
both parties advanced and adopted these ideas. 
  Ac-
cordingly, I call it the “Brute Luck” theory of insurance. 
 As mentioned earlier, these three theories of health insurance are 
not mutually exclusive, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
59 For more information on the Health Promotion theory, see supra notes 7-12 
and accompanying text.  
60 For more information on the Financial Security theory, see supra notes 13-17 
and accompanying text. 
61 For more information on the Brute Luck theory, see supra notes 19-22 and ac-
companying text. 
HOFFMAN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  2:04 PM 
2011] Three Models of Health Insurance 1889 
Figure 1:  Image of the Three Theories of 
Health Insurance and Their Overlap 
 
Harms to health can also pose a significant harm to wealth, as illu-
strated in Figure 1 by the overlap in the column down the middle.  
And harms resulting from brute luck result in harms to health, wealth, 
or both.  While these three different ways of conceptualizing health 
insurance are not mutually exclusive, I explain in Part III how tensions 
arise where their goals or priorities diverge. 
As a final preliminary matter, it is possible—and perhaps prefera-
ble—that the goals discussed in each of the following Sections could 
be achieved through mechanisms other than insurance.  For example, 
studies have shown that investments in public health, clean water, 
education, sanitation systems, and nutrition—or generally ameliorat-
ing income inequality—have a larger impact on population health 
than investments in access to medical care.62
 
62 According to one scholar,  
  Sin taxes on cigarettes or 
The broad determinants of health and its distribution in a population include 
income and wealth, education, political participation, the distributions of 
rights and powers, and opportunity. . . . We cannot achieve effective promo-
 
Random 
Preventable 
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prohibition of smoking in public places might be a better way to en-
courage people to engage responsibly in risk avoidance.  Expanded 
welfare programs or modified bankruptcy policies are alternative ways 
to deal with financial insecurity due to high medical care costs.  This 
Article may obscure such alternative—and perhaps in some cases su-
perior—ways to achieve these goals because it instead narrowly ad-
dresses the use of insurance as a tool to achieve the desired end.  Ob-
scuring these alternatives should not be read as diminishing them; 
rather, this Article simply hones in on insurance because it is the pri-
mary tool on which PPACA relies to achieve to such results. 
A.  Health Promotion 
And insurance companies will be required to cover, with no extra 
charge, routine checkups and preventive care, like mammograms and 
colonoscopies because there’s no reason we shouldn’t be catching dis-
eases like breast cancer and colon cancer before they get worse. 
President Barack Obama
63
We don’t pay rewards for great management of chronic disease. . . . I’m 
talking about paying people who actually do a good job to do prevention. 
 
Senator Tom Coburn (R, OK)64
1.  Theory 
 
The Health Promotion model of health insurance is based on the 
idea that insurance should protect against harms to health.  This idea 
featured strongly in health reform discussions of policies regarding 
coverage of preventive services, federally defined mandated health 
benefits, investments in research to identify high-value services, and 
investments in primary care and public health infrastructure. 
The Health Promotion theory involves two core ideas.  First, 
health insurance should primarily function to foster health by distri-
 
tion of health in a society as well as its fair distribution without a just distribu-
tion of these other goods.   
DANIELS, supra note 25, at 4; see also Elhauge, supra note 25, at 1460-61 (discussing the 
value of investments in nutrition, sanitation, and other alternatives over medical care); 
Gostin, supra note 7, at 14-17 (discussing the significance of infrastructure in prevailing 
public health problems). 
63 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Health Care Reform, 2009 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 693 (Sept. 9, 2009). 
64 Senator Tom Coburn, Remarks at the White House Health Care Summit (Feb. 
25, 2010), transcript available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502664_pf.html.      
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buting the costs of indemnifying against harms to health among all 
insured.  It can do so by using insurance dollars to prevent the onset 
of illness or injury or to limit the impact of illness or injury that oc-
cur.65  Second, health insurance should prioritize spending on the 
most valuable interventions for promoting health.  In other words, in-
surance spending should be cost-effective or high value, with value de-
fined as health benefit gained per dollar spent.66
These core ideas, when translated into practice, will often mean al-
location of spending on more basic interventions and treatment for 
more people, rather than for intensive treatment for fewer people.
  Under this theory, 
insurance is thus first and foremost a mechanism to pool and redistri-
bute the costs of promoting a healthy population. 
67  
Economists have shown that initial dollars spent on any individual’s 
health are generally high value, in terms of producing positive health 
outcomes, and in many (but not all) cases, the last dollars spent are low 
value.68  Spending with lower marginal benefit is often called spending 
on the “Flat of the Curve.”69  It is not clear exactly which spending is on 
the flat of the curve, but it is believed that many current health expend-
itures, particularly for expensive technologies and end-of-life care, fall 
on it.70  It also appears that some people are likely engaged in less valu-
able spending, while others lack basic care.  The average amount spent 
on care annually per insured American nears $10,000.71
 
65 See, e.g., Jane Sidorov & Martha Romney, The Spectrum of Care (arguing that pre-
vention is a key component of the concept of “population health,” or general well-
being), in POPULATION HEALTH, supra note 
  And most un-
7, at 3, 7; see also Gostin, supra note 7, at 23 
(arguing that insurance encourages more use of health services and thus better health 
outcomes); Mariner, supra note 7, at 447 (noting that “[i]t makes sense to pay for pre-
vention”); Nyman, supra note 7, at 142 (arguing that insurance makes expensive pro-
cedures more affordable).     
66 See, e.g., PORTER & TEISBERG, supra note 7, at 98 (arguing that “[t]he right objec-
tive for health care is to increase value for patients”); Chernew et al., supra note 7, at 
W195-96 (proposing a value-based, rather than cost-based, copayment scheme so as to 
achieve more efficient outcomes).  
67 See, e.g., Swartz, supra note 8, at 55-56 (arguing that such a system would enable 
savings from fewer expensive services to fund more basic care).   
68 Gruber, supra note 7, at 582-83 & 583 fig.2 (citing empirical works studying the 
“causal impact of health insurance on health” and graphing the diminishing marginal 
value of additional spending in a theoretical “health effectiveness curve”).   
69 Id.  
70 See id. at 584 (“Eventually, additional spending does no good in terms of im-
proving health and the effectiveness curve flattens out . . . .”); Swartz, supra note 8, at 
55-56 (advocating for limiting coverage of expensive, ineffective technology). 
71 Health care costs in 2010 are estimated to be just over $2.5 trillion for just over 
250 million insured.  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., UPDATED NATIONAL 
HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2009–2019 tbl.1 (2010), available at https:// 
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insured Americans receive little to no care.72  A Health Promotion 
model would trade flat-of-the-curve spending for higher-marginal-value 
spending.73
Because Health Promotion insurance would be designed to reim-
burse care for treatments that are deemed most valuable for maintain-
ing or promoting health, it is not deterred by concerns of moral ha-
zard with regard to insurance coverage for such treatments.
  Dollars would be reallocated from members of a risk pool 
who would benefit less to those who would benefit more. 
74  The 
moral hazard principle is the idea that insurance coverage induces 
people to engage in riskier behavior to the extent insurance indemni-
fies any harms that may result.75  For example, in the case of liability 
insurance for toxic torts, some are concerned that the very presence 
of insurance will make polluters less likely to avoid harmful pollution 
once they are indemnified by insurance.76  With respect to health, 
“moral hazard” refers to insurance both causing people to overuse 
medical care and causing them to take risks they might have avoided 
had they been uninsured (e.g., skydiving or entering hot dog eating 
contests).77
 
www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/NHEProjections2009to2019.pdf; 
see also DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 
  Typically, those who are concerned about moral hazard in 
34, at 71 tbl.C-1 (reporting more than fifty mil-
lion uninsured Americans in 2009); Press Release, United States Census, U.S. Census Bu-
reau Announces 2010 Census Population Counts—Apportionment Count Delivered to 
President (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/ 
operations/cb10-cn93.html (reporting that the U.S. population on April 1, 2010, was just 
over 300 million).   
72 See Gruber, supra note 7, at 582 (“There is a clear belief among the public and 
policymakers that being uninsured is bad for your health.”). 
73 Costs of health-promoting medical care would be aggregated and then divided up 
among the population.  We could choose to divide the costs equally so that each Ameri-
can must pay an equal share, or we could choose to allocate costs based upon any other 
criterion, such as income.  Certain premium designs might be more compatible with the 
goal of protecting against risks to wealth as well, as discussed in Section II.B.   
74 For an interesting perspective on moral hazard, see generally Deborah Stone, 
Beyond Moral Hazard:  Insurance as Moral Opportunity, in EMBRACING RISK:  THE CHANG-
ING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 52 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon 
eds., 2002). 
75 See generally Pauly, supra note 19 (defining the economics of moral hazard in the 
context of health insurance and mechanisms employed to reduce the problem). 
76 See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 49-50 (noting that an insured with “claims-made 
coverage” is likely to underestimate the cost of liability compared to the cost of invest-
ment in loss prevention). 
77 See Pauly, supra note 19, at 535 (explaining that insurance is considered a “mor-
al hazard” because it lowers the marginal cost of care, thus possibly “increas[ing] [its] 
usage”); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979) 
(“Moral hazard refers here to the tendency of insurance protection to alter an individ-
ual’s motive to prevent loss.”). 
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the health care context are focused on potential overuse and argue 
for less insurance coverage so that people bear the costs of the care 
they use and presumably use less care, in turn.78  In contrast, a Health 
Promotion approach aims to encourage people to use more care.  
This theory rests on the belief that current levels of use of high-value 
services are too low and that increased use is cost-effective or morally 
justified.  Thus, providing coverage for interventions that are known 
to promote health (e.g., vaccinations, primary care, and dental care) 
is intended to increase their use.  Insurance can serve as what Debo-
rah Stone has called a “moral opportunity” to define a higher baseline 
for a community standard of care.79
A range of economic and moral arguments could be made in 
support of health promotion.  Before delving into the more tenable 
arguments, I want to expose the uncertainty of one frequent assump-
tion regarding the role of preventive care in health promotion:  name-
ly, that use of preventive care leads to reduced medical care costs.  
Evidence suggests that that much prevention and early treatment of 
disease is not cost saving—at either the individual or the system level.
 
80  
Considered at the individual level, prevention might simply delay the 
onset of expensive disease.  Although some research suggests that pre-
ventive care or early detection can create a “compression of morbidi-
ty,” reducing the total amount of time that people are sick over a life-
time and thus saving money in care,81
 
78 See Pauly, supra note 
 many studies suggest that it 
19, at 537 (noting that “some uncertain medical care ex-
penses will not and should not be insured in an optimal situation”); Shavell, supra note 
77, at 541 (describing “incomplete coverage against loss” as a “partial solution to the 
problem of moral hazard”).   
79 Stone, supra note 74, at 53. 
80 See LOUISE B. RUSSELL, NAT’L COAL. ON HEALTH CARE, PREVENTION’S POTENTIAL 
FOR SLOWING THE GROWTH OF MEDICAL SPENDING 8 (2007) [hereinafter RUSSELL, PRE-
VENTION’S POTENTIAL], available at http://www.ihhcpar.rutgers.edu/downloads/nchc_ 
report.pdf (“[T]he evidence does not support the commonly accepted idea that preven-
tion always, or even usually, reduces medical costs . . . .”); see also LOUISE B. RUSSELL, IS 
PREVENTION BETTER THAN CURE? 3 (1986) (“[E]ven when the financial cost of the pre-
ventative measure looks small, careful evaluation often shows that the full costs are ra-
ther large . . . . In fact, prevention usually adds to medical expenditures.”).  But see Mi-
chael V. Maciosek et al., Greater Use of Preventive Services in U.S. Health Care Could Save 
Lives at Little or No Cost, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1656, 1656, 1658 (2010) (noting that others, 
including Russell, have challenged the idea that preventive care saves money, but find-
ing that certain preventive services may be increased “without an increase in net cost”). 
81 See, e.g., James F. Fries, Aging, Natural Death, and the Compression of Morbidity, 303 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 130, 132-34 (1980) (showing that as chronic diseases, rather than 
acute illness, become an increased cause of death, delaying the onset of the disease 
can reduce the amount of time spent sick with the disease).  Chronic diseases are also 
considered one of the major drivers of health care costs in the United States, account-
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simply delays morbidity and, at best, shifts costs from employers to 
Medicare.82  Considered in the aggregate, it is difficult to save money 
with prevention and diagnostic services because of the economics of 
disease and medical expenditures.  Health care spending is extremely 
skewed:  a small number of people experience high medical care costs 
in any one year and most experience none.83  In fact, the top five per-
cent of spenders account for over half of medical care costs in the coun-
try.84  But for the most part, we do not know who will be part of this five 
percent in a given year.  Thus, to identify and stave off expensive disease 
for the few, we must extend prevention to the many.  Even if the per-
person costs of prevention are relatively low, the total aggregate costs 
are high and likely greater than the costs of disease and treatment pre-
vented for the few.  For example, if we provide a $100 diagnostic test to 
all Americans this year, it will cost $30 billion.85  Even if this test consi-
derably improves the health of 300,000 people, it would have to save an 
average of $100,000 in medical care per person to be cost-neutral.  Even 
the top spenders do not typically incur medical care costs as high as 
$100,000 in a year.86  If this test were widereaching and provided benefit 
for 3 million people (1% of the population), it must still result in sav-
ings of $10,000 per person.  Most preventive interventions, including 
statins for high cholesterol and blood pressure medications, screening 
tests, and some wellness efforts, are unlikely to have such wide applica-
tion and generally do not reduce total medical care spending.87
 
ing for as much as seventy-five percent of health care expenditures in 2008.  Steven H. 
Woolf, The Power of Prevention and What It Requires, 299 JAMA 2437, 2437 (2008).  
  Most 
practitioners agree, however, that preventive care is valuable even if not 
82 See, e.g., James J. Mongan et al., Options for Slowing the Growth of Health Care Costs, 
358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1509, 1512 (2008). 
83 See Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, 
Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 9, 12 (noting that in 1996, “the top 1 per-
cent of the [U.S.] population accounted for 27 percent of aggregate expenditures”); 
see also THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS:  A PRIMER  5 (2009), 
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7670_02.pdf (“A small share of 
people accounts for a significant share of expenses in any year.”).  
84 See Berk & Monheit, supra note 83, at 12 (referring to 1996 statistics).   
85 See Press Release, United States Census 2010, supra note 71 (reporting that the 
U.S. population on April 1, 2010, was just over three hundred million).  
86 See Berk & Monheit, supra note 83, at 13 (noting that in 1996, “the top 1 percent 
spent $56,459 per person” on health care costs).   
87 See RUSSELL, PREVENTION’S POTENTIAL, supra note 80,  at 4-7 (citing various stu-
dies).  But see Katherine Baicker et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can Generate Savings, 
29 HEALTH AFF. 304, 308 (2010) (finding through a literature survey that workplace 
wellness programs saved $3.27 per dollar spent and that absenteeism costs fell by $2.73 
for every dollar spent). 
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cost saving because it can increase quality of life or extend years of life.  
As Louise Russell, a leading expert on the subject, has said, “The addi-
tional cost may be worthwhile, because it brings better health, but med-
ical spending is not reduced.”88
A number of more tenable arguments are based upon the eco-
nomic and moral value of investments in health improvement.  Eco-
nomic arguments address market failures or individual decision-
making errors that are detrimental to health.  First, coverage could 
ameliorate externalities.  Both scholars and employers have argued 
that if insurance promotes health, it has the potential to increase 
worker productivity and reduce labor costs, eliminating negative ex-
ternalities of poor health on workplace efficiency.
  Thus, even as some cost savings are 
possible, the primary justification for Health Promotion insurance is the 
value or cost-effectiveness of such interventions in improving health 
and quality of life. 
89  Investments in 
increasing health through, for example, mental health coverage or 
annual flu shots could decrease worker absences and increase overall 
worker productivity.90  In addition, some argue that coverage can ad-
dress underutilization when insurance encourages individuals to con-
sume services that have individual costs and social benefits, or positive 
externalities.91
 
88 RUSSELL, PREVENTION’S POTENTIAL, supra note 
  The classic example is that insurance could cover vac-
80, at 6; cf. Nyman, supra note 7, 
at 146 (“There are a number of potential approaches for estimating the value to the 
consumer of expensive medical procedures.”).   
89 See, e.g., Loeppke, supra note 7, at 123 (“The increasing burden of illness and 
health risk is leading to increased healthcare costs and reduced productivity in the 
United States . . . .”); Woolf, supra note 81, at 2437 (referring to a study by Fortune 
500 companies showing lost productivity due to smoking (citing 1 CTR. FOR PREVEN-
TION & HEALTH SERVS. & NAT’L BUS. GROUP ON HEALTH, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 5, REDUC-
ING THE BURDEN OF SMOKING ON EMPLOYEE HEALTH AND PRODUCTIVITY (2003), avail-
able at http://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pdfs/issuebrief_cphssmoking.pdf)).  
90 See, e.g., Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers 
Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,734 ( July 19, 2010) [hereinafter Interim Final Rules for 
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers] (discussing a study which “found that 
69 million workers reported missing days due to illness and 55 million workers reported a 
time when they were unable to concentrate at work because of their own illness or a 
family member’s illness” (citing KAREN DAVIS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, ISSUE 
BRIEF, PUB. NO. 856, HEALTH AND PRODUCTIVITY AMONG U.S. WORKERS 1, 2-3 (2005), 
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/856_Davis_hlt_productivity_ 
USworkers.pdf)).  
91 See Amy B. Monahan, Value-Based Mandated Health Benefits, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 
127, 136-37 (2009) (noting that a mandated health benefit “would be justified where 
there is evidence of suboptimal utilization” and where “the treatment is sufficiently 
price-elastic”). 
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cinations to avoid a situation in which too few in a community are vac-
cinated and everyone becomes more vulnerable to serious illness—the 
aggregate harms of which are greater than the aggregate of individual 
costs of vaccination.  To deter such inefficient results, insurance cov-
erage creates incentives for individuals to seek out vaccination, lower-
ing barriers to achieving herd immunity.92  In a related vein, some 
have argued that a baseline of health is critical for maintaining a pop-
ulation able to fuel economic prosperity and provide military de-
fense.93
Second, coverage can counterbalance individual underinvestment 
in certain services because of decisionmaking errors and biases.  Indi-
viduals are likely to undervalue certain medical interventions that 
might stave off future problems (e.g., tests for early detection) if they 
must bear the cost of such services today for the chance of potential 
and uncertain benefit in the future.
  Health insurance could cover services necessary to promote 
maintenance of such a baseline, however defined. 
94
 
92 States might, of course, also mandate vaccination against certain diseases.  For a 
discussion of modern vaccinations and public health goals, see generally Kevin M. Ma-
lone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates:  The Public Health Imperative and Individ-
ual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 338 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2007). 
  The inclusion of these services 
under the umbrella of insurance—particularly if covered with low 
cost-sharing obligations—can tip the scales toward more efficient use 
93 See, e.g., 1 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. 
& BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE:  THE 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 14 
(1983) [hereinafter SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE] (noting that “[i]n the lst half 
of the nineteenth century,” health services were driven by the goal of “achiev[ing] a 
more productive labor force and a healthier general populace for purposes of national 
defense”); Alan Lyles, The Political Landscape in Relation to the Health and Wealth of Na-
tions (describing a finding that a significant percentage of World War I military recruits 
were unhealthy (citing Stanley Joel Reiser, The Emergence of the Concept of Screening for 
Disease, 56 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. HEALTH & SOC. 403 (1978))), in  POPULATION 
HEALTH, supra note 7, at 295, 297. 
94 See Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for the Invincibles:  Enticing Low Risks 
into the Health-Insurance Pool with an Idea from Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 
2010 WIS. L. REV. 79, 95 (discussing how optimism bias—and the “unfounded belief 
that bad things will not happen”—leads to underinsurance); Monahan, supra note 91, 
at 140-44 (discussing problems of risk assessment relating to “health insurance pur-
chasing decisions”); Ronald J. Ozminkowski et al., Predictors of Preventive Service Use 
Among Medicare Beneficiaries, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring 2006, at 5, 18 (find-
ing that people with better health underuse preventive care).  See generally Neil D. 
Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interven-
tions (describing the persistence of optimism bias in patients’ judgments of their own 
health risks), in HEURISTICS AND BIASES 313 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).   
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of such services.95
Finally, a number of moral justifications could be made for Health 
Promotion insurance as a tool for distributive justice.
  While under the Brute Luck theory discussed be-
low, insurance would not cover services that are part of what an in-
formed person should rationally invest in independently to protect 
her own health, Health Promotion insurance is more concerned with 
staving off the negative health results of underuse.  By increasing use, 
this approach can lead to social efficiency gains when costs of avoiding 
poor health are collectivized. 
96  Some, for ex-
ample, argue broadly that health is a human right, or a fundamental 
or primary need, and that access to medical care can help realize this 
right.97  Others articulate more specifically what a right to health 
would entail, based on particular demands of distributive justice.  
Norman Daniels contends that health is important as a gateway in life, 
building on Rawlsian theory to argue that health is necessary to pur-
sue reasonable opportunities or “normal functioning.”98  Martha 
Nussbaum, bringing specificity to the “capabilities approach” she and 
Amaryta Sen have advanced, claims access to “bodily health” is a “cen-
tral human capability.”99
 
95 For a discussion of insurance coverage and elasticity of demand, see infra note 
  These claims are more expansive than the 
luck-egalitarian claims discussed below in support of Brute Luck in-
106 and accompanying text. 
96 For an extensive discussion of social-utility and distributive-justice-based argu-
ments for health care, see William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare:  
Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 602-47 (2007).  See 
also SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 93, at 16-20 (“Ethical concern 
about the distribution of health care derives from the special importance of health 
care in promoting personal well-being by preventing or relieving pain, suffering, and 
disability and by avoiding loss of life.”).   
97 See, e.g., Anja Rudiger, From Market Competition to Solidarity?  Assessing the Prospects 
of U.S. Health Care Reform Plans from a Human Rights Perspective, HEALTH & HUM. RTS., 
no. 1, 2008, at 123, 125-27 (recognizing that the U.S. health reform debate increasingly 
viewed health care as a “shared responsibility” as opposed to a personal one); Amartya 
Sen, Comment, Why and How Is Health a Human Right?, 372 LANCET 2010, 2010 (2008) 
(arguing that legislation should be guided by a view of health as a human right); Alicia 
Ely Yamin, The Right to Health Under International Law and Its Relevance to the United States, 
95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1156, 1156 (2005) (“Under international law, there is a right 
not merely to health care but to the much broader concept of health.”).   
98 See DANIELS, supra note 25, at 14 (“Failing to promote health in a population, 
that is, failing to promote normal functioning in it, fails to protect the opportunity or 
capability of people to function as free and equal citizens.”). 
99 Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements:  Sen and Social Jus-
tice, FEMINIST ECON., nos. 2-3, 2003, at 33, 41.  Daniels contends that, in application, 
capabilities and opportunity largely converge when the goal is to preserve normal 
functioning.  DANIELS, supra note 25, at 69-70.   
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surance because they would restore normal functioning or promote 
capabilities, regardless of whether the source of the deficit were 
choice or chance.100
Others argue that coverage of high-value services could level the in-
equitable access to medical care between rich and poor Americans.
 
101  
Researchers have clearly shown that low socioeconomic status is a de-
terminant of poor health.102
 
100 See id. at 72 (discussing the difference between the “opportunity for welfare” 
theory and a view that protects normal functioning).   
  In other words, someone born into a poor 
family has a statistically higher chance of facing health problems over 
her life.  Some face a resource constraint that makes obtaining even ar-
guably basic needs, such as “well-child” care and essential pharmaceuti-
cals, difficult if not covered (or only partially covered) by insurance.  
For example, if a low-income worker is advised to take cholesterol-
lowering medication, she is less likely to do so if she must pay for all or 
part of the cost out of pocket.  Better insurance coverage for such inter-
101 See, e.g., BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 247 (2006) (“[A] plan for uni-
versal health-care coverage would do more to eliminate health disparities between 
whites and minorities than any race-specific programs we might design.”); Gostin, supra 
note 7, at 33-34 (critiquing the U.S. health care system for its barriers to access and re-
sulting negative outcomes that low-income individuals face); Amartya Sen, Why Health 
Equity? (arguing equal access to health care is a part, albeit a small one, of health equi-
ty), in PUBLIC HEALTH, ETHICS AND EQUITY 21, 22-26 (Sudhir Anand et al. eds., 2004).  
102 The research on “social determinants” of health is considerable.  See, e.g., RI-
CHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL (2009) (showing the effect of 
income inequality on health); Michael G. Marmot, Social Differentials in Health Within 
and Between Populations, DAEDALUS, Fall 1994, at 197 (noting that while mortality rates 
declined from 1965 to 1990, the disparity in rates between socioeconomic groups grew, 
suggesting that socioeconomic status could be an important determinant of health); 
Neil Pearce & George Davey Smith, Is Social Capital the Key to Inequalities in Health?, 93 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 122, 122 (2003) (“It has long been established that socioeconomic 
factors are major determinants of health and mortality.”); Geoffrey Rose, Sick Individu-
als and Sick Populations, 14 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 32, 38 (1985) (arguing that it is criti-
cal to examine both determinants of individual cases of disease as well as incidence 
rate among a population and concluding that “[c]ase-centered epidemiology identifies 
individual susceptibiity, but it may fail to identify the underlying causes of incidence”); 
Jennifer Prah Ruger, Ethics of the Social Determinants of Health, 364 LANCET 1092, 1092-96 
(2004) (providing an overview of social-determinants literature and different theories 
on how to address the problems of health that might be a result of low socioeconomic 
status); Paul Starr, The Politics of Therapeutic Nihilism, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Oct. 1976, at 
24, 28 (1976) (“In all age groups, people in lower-income families are reported to be 
less healthy, sometimes dramatically so.”); Peter Townsend & Nick Davidson, Introduc-
tion to INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH:  THE BLACK REPORT? 13, 20-23 (Douglas Black et al. 
eds., 1982) (discussing “recent studies . . . filling in our knowledge of the long-term, 
pervasive effects of class membership on health and development throughout life”); 
Daniel Wikler, Personal and Social Responsibility for Health, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 47, 47 
(2002) (cautioning against overemphasizing personal responsibility for health in craft-
ing health policy).  
HOFFMAN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  2:04 PM 
2011] Three Models of Health Insurance 1899 
ventions—if deemed high-value—make it more likely that a lower-
income insured will be able to use medical care in the same way as her 
higher-income counterpart. 
Finally, insurance can fulfill what some see as a communal, or 
perhaps religious, obligation to care for others who are ill or injured, 
or to alleviate the pain some feel from watching others suffer.103  Such 
notions draw from a tradition of medical care as a collective concern 
of religious communities and professional societies, where these 
groups ensured the health of members of their community.104
As discussed further below, each of these above justifications 
would lead to a somewhat different design of a Health Promotion in-
surance system.  What unites such justifications, though, and what dis-
tinguishes them from the justifications offered under the Financial 
Security or Brute Luck approaches, is the belief that insurance should 
be designed primarily to increase the use of services that best promote 
health to achieve any one or more of the above normative goals. 
   
This means that as applied in a Health Promotion system, insurance 
would be designed to create incentives for increased use of high-value 
interventions, where the current level of use is considered suboptimal.  
Motivated by this idea, Michael Chernew and others have promoted a 
model of “value-based insurance design,” in which coverage and cost-
sharing design both creates greater incentives for use of high-value in-
terventions and deters use of lower-value interventions.105
 
103 See Elhauge, supra note 
  For example, 
a high-value intervention might be covered with no cost-sharing obliga-
tion (i.e., “first-dollar” coverage) or with relatively low cost sharing.  A 
low-value intervention might not be covered, or might be covered but 
require the insured to pay high cost-sharing obligations for the service.  
25, at 1483 (citing “the moral discomfort imposed on 
others when the poor go without medical treatment” as a reason why we feel obligated 
to provide health care for those who cannot afford it). 
104 For an examination of the culture of social welfare programs, including health 
care, in fraternal societies, see generally David T. Beito, Mutual Aid, State Welfare, and 
Organized Charity:  Fraternal Societies and the “Deserving” and “Undeserving” Poor, 1900–
1930, 5 J. POL’Y HIST. 419 (1993). 
105 See generally Chernew et al., supra note 7.  Separating out high- and low-value 
treatments—while perhaps simple in concept—is far from simple in practice.  In the 
health reform debates, the tumult over so-called “death panels” highlights the sensitivity 
of such determinations.  The mere discussion of counseling to help people make ra-
tioning decisions with respect to their own care ignited a national backlash to reform.  
See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, Getting to the Source of the “Death Panel” Rumor, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at A1. 
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Assuming that demand for covered services is elastic106
Oregon has experimented with value-informed coverage decisions 
in its Medicaid program, known as the Oregon Health Plan (OHP).  
The initial goal of the OHP was to provide fewer services to more 
people, rather than more services to fewer.
—when cost has 
significant influence over what treatments people use—such a design 
would lead to more use of high-value treatments.  Health Promotion in-
surance relies on the fact that demand is elastic enough that covering 
health-promoting treatments will increase their use sufficiently to gen-
erate the desired health improvements. 
107  Oregon developed a 
rank-order list of over 700 conditions and treatments based on their 
relative health value, which the state intended to use to ration care by 
service type.108  This list now informs an early stage, value-based insur-
ance design plan for the state.109
 
106 Studies show that expanded coverage leads to more utilization overall, but it is 
difficult to know exactly how elastic the demand is for particular services.  See, e.g., JON-
ATHAN GRUBER, THE ROLE OF CONSUMER COPAYMENTS FOR HEALTH CARE:  LESSONS 
FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT AND BEYOND 9 (2006), available at 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7566.pdf (discussing various studies revealing 
information about elasticity of demand for various medical treatments); Monahan, su-
pra note 
 
91, at 136 (“A medical service is price elastic when the quantity of the service 
that is demanded varies markedly and inversely with price.  There is evidence that 
medical care, generally speaking, is price elastic.” (footnote omitted)). 
107 See generally Joan M. Kapowich, Oregon’s Test of Value-Based Insurance Design in Cov-
erage for State Workers, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2028 (2010) (describing Oregon’s approach to val-
ue-based insurance design); OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., OREGON HEALTH PLAN:  AN 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (2006), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/healthplan/ 
data_pubs/ohpoverview0706.pdf (providing a history of the Oregon plan); see also 
Somnath Saha et al., Giving Teeth to Comparative-Effectiveness Research—The Oregon Expe-
rience, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e18, e18(2) (2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/ 
10.1056/NEJMp0912938 (explaining that the Oregon Health Service Commission “was 
charged with setting coverage priorities”).  The Oregon Plan’s roots reach back to a 
1987 legislative decision to discontinue Medicaid funding of soft-tissue transplants.  See 
OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., supra, at 1.  Controversial rationing decisions are again in 
the news with Arizona’s recent decision not to fund certain low-success transplants in 
its Medicaid program.  See Kevin Sack, Arizona’s Medicaid Cuts Are Seen as a Sign of the 
Financial Times, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at A22 (detailing criticisms of Arizona’s Me-
dicaid spending cuts). 
108 See OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., supra note 107, at 16 (noting that “[a]s of Jan-
uary 1, 2006, [the Oregon Health Plan] cover[ed] services up through line 530 of the 
710 condition treatment pairs on the list.”); Saha et al., supra note 107, at e18(3) (pre-
senting a chart with examples at each insurance tier).  The highest priority categories 
of services include maternity care, newborn care, preventive services, and medical or 
psychotherapy treatment for drug and tobacco abuse.  See OR. HEALTH SERVS. 
COMM’N, PRIORITIZED LIST OF HEALTH SERVICES (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http:// 
www.oregon.gov/OHPPR/HSC/docs/Oct10List.pdf.  
109 Saha et al., supra note 107, at e18(3).  
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As Oregon learned when the public rejected its initial prioritiza-
tion list for assigning too little value to certain services,110 the goal of 
promoting health means different things to different people.  The de-
finition of “high value” was intended to guide insurance design, priori-
tization of treatments, and distribution of spending among subgroups 
of the population and among different individuals.  But what is high 
value is subjective.  Ranking care by relative value can quickly draw ire, 
as was clearly evinced most recently when health care debates devolved 
to accusations of “death panels” in the summer of 2009.111
In fact, the above moral and economic arguments for general 
health promotion each would define which interventions are most val-
uable, based on why health is considered important.  Each would imply 
a different way of prioritizing treatments among a population to serve a 
particular justicial or economic goal.  For example, Norman Daniels 
would care more about bolstering the future potential health of young 
people than promoting the health of old people, if health is more criti-
cal to preserving normal functioning and lifespan for the young.
 
112
 
110 In its initial implementation efforts, Oregon announced prioritization deci-
sions that were publicly criticized and altered after being exposed and deemed illogi-
cal.  For example, the Oregon Health Plan initially prioritized certain treatments simp-
ly because they were so inexpensive that they could be administered widely with little 
cost.  The public objected to the placement of such treatments higher on the list than 
critically important but more expensive treatments.  See David C. Hadorn, Setting Health 
Care Priorities in Oregon:  Cost-Effectiveness Meets the Rule of Rescue, 265 JAMA 2218, 2218-
19 (1991) (documenting the criticism of Oregon’s list, which prioritized headache 
treatment over some lifesaving measures (citing Timothy Egan, Problems Could Delay 
Proposal by Oregon to Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1990, at A8)); Louis W. Sul-
livan, Op-Ed, Oregon Health Plan Is Unfair to the Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1992, at 
A16 (criticizing the proposed plan for discriminating against disabled people).   
  In 
contrast, a prioritarian might want insurance to promote health for the 
worst off in society, particularly if their health is poor in the first place 
111 See Brendan Nyhan, Why the “Death Panel” Myth Wouldn’t Die:  Misinformation in the 
Health Care Reform Debate, 8 THE FORUM, Issue 1, art. 5, 2001, at 1, 6-11, http:// 
www.bepress.com/forum/vol8/iss1/art5/ (explaining how Betsy McCaughey created the 
prominent “death panel” myth and depicting, in table form, its spread among prominent 
conservatives throughout the health reform debate); Press Release, Statement by House 
GOP Leaders Boehner and McCotter on End-of-Life Treatment Counseling in Demo-
crats’ Health Care Legislation ( July 23, 2009), available at https://speaker.house.gov/ 
News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=139131 (expressing concern about end-of-
life counseling). 
112 DANIELS, supra note 25, at 179-80; see also Ruger, supra note 102, at 1092-94 
(discussing the difference between an equality-of-opportunity approach, such as that 
advocated by John Rawls and Norman Daniels, and an equality-of-results approach, 
closer to the vision put forth by Amartya Sen, which argues that capabilities must be 
taken into account in distributional decisions if differences in capabilities could create 
unequal results even in the face of equal opportunities). 
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because of a relative lack of access to resources, education, and nutri-
tion.113
While actualizing the notion of Health Promotion insurance is not 
simple, the most important point for present purposes is the common 
thread that undergirds any actualization:  health insurance allocation 
decisions should be made toward the end goal of promoting health.  
The primary goal of health insurance is thus to promote health for 
Americans by redistributing the costs of the highest-value, health-
promoting interventions—however defined—among all insured. 
  Alternately, insurance would first promote the health of workers 
in their prime if the driving motivation is economic productivity.   
Despite the intuitive appeal to some of the argument that health 
insurance should aim to improve overall population health by funding 
high-value care, others question whether this approach is really “in-
surance” at all.  Critics claim that insurance coverage that creates in-
centives for the use of relatively low-cost preventive or diagnostic ser-
vice is more like a medical prepayment plan than an insurance plan.114  
Such a view presumes a particular function for health insurance that 
privileges indemnification of individual risks.  In contrast, the primary 
goal of Health Promotion insurance is one of social efficiency, not 
economic efficiency in the Pareto sense,115
 
113 See Persad et al., supra note 
 because some may in fact 
be made worse off to make others healthier.  In order to serve many 
of the goals delineated above, it is necessary to use a collective ap-
proach to mitigate harms to health that are socially inefficient.  To see 
indemnification of such losses as insurance requires reframing the risk 
at hand as a risk to a population as a whole.  For example, if we frame 
the risk as the perpetuation of a suboptimally unhealthy population or 
an undesirable distribution of health among a population—which 
25, at 424-25 (discussing approaches that are cha-
racteristic of a health care system that favors the worst off).  
114 See, e.g., JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER:  THE 
FREE-ENTERPRISE ALTERNATIVE TO CLINTON’S HEALTH PLAN 24 (1994) (arguing that 
because there “need not be any risky event to trigger insurance payments,” because the 
payment is determined by “consumption decisions,” and because the payment is made 
“not to the insured but to the medical providers,” “health insurance is not insurance at 
all”); Martin S. Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. ECON. 
251, 276-77 (1973) (advocating the restructuring of health insurance to “reduc[e] its 
role as a method of prepaying small . . . bills” and to increase its use as a protection 
against large risks); Pauly, supra note 19, at 534-35 (arguing that we do not find “insur-
ance” in pure form for nonrandom, low-risk medical events, such as “visits to a physi-
cian’s office” or dental care).   
115 For a description of Pareto optimality, see THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN 
ECONOMICS 324 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992).  “When the economy’s resources 
and output are allocated in such a way that no reallocation can make anyone better off 
without making at least one other worse off, then a Pareto optimum is said to exist.”  Id. 
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could be deemed a problem for any of the economic or moral reasons 
noted above—we can use insurance as a collective approach to miti-
gate such a risk.  Insurance would do so by allocating dollars toward 
those harms that pose the greatest risks to overall health or that cause 
unjust inequities.  Furthermore, even if this approach is inconsistent 
with certain economic conceptions of insurance, it is in reality a func-
tion of insurance in operation—a function that is becoming increa-
singly prominent under PPACA, as I will discuss in the next subsec-
tion.  Thus, while a Health Promotion theory of insurance is counter-
intuitive to those who view insurance as a tool that an individual can 
use to prevent individual risks to the degree she wants, insurance sys-
tems and scholars have long embraced the reality that health insur-
ance could serve collective goals in addition to cushioning individuals 
against shocks116
2.  Health Promotion Policies of PPACA 
—the main focus of the next two theories. 
Health reform debates, not surprisingly, readily embraced the 
idea that health insurance should promote health.117
For example, the law requires all nongrandfathered health insur-
ance plans to cover certain preventive care without any cost shar-
ing,
  A number of the 
most popular PPACA policies are justified by a Health Promotion 
conception of health insurance, expanding insurance coverage for 
services that promise to promote or maintain the health of insureds.  
These policies are often agnostic to the wealth of recipients of such 
care and do not treat chance and choice harms differently—the pri-
mary concerns of the two theories discussed below.  These policies, I 
contend, have the primary and sometimes sole purpose of collectiviz-
ing the costs of selected health-promoting interventions by placing 
them under the umbrella of insurance coverage. 
118
 
116 See, e.g., Richard B. Saltman & Hans F.W. Dubois, The Historical and Social Base of 
Social Health Insurance Systems (emphasizing the importance of solidarity in socialized 
health care systems in Western Europe), in SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEMS IN 
WESTERN EUROPE 21, 29 (Richard B. Saltman et al. eds., 2004); Stone, supra note 
 effectively distributing the costs of prevention broadly among 
74, at 
53 (highlighting the social and public benefits derived from collectively provided in-
surance).   See generally GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 13 (discussing the role of social 
insurance in promoting family economic security).  
117 See, e.g., Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform:  Preventive Services, HEALTH 
AFF. BLOG ( July 15, 2010, 11:29 AM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/07/15/ 
implementing-health-reform-preventive-services/print (noting the emphasis on pre-
ventive care and improving health in PPACA).   
118 PPACA sec. 1001, § 2713, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
HOFFMAN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  2:04 PM 
1904 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1873 
insured in such plans (an estimated 78 million Americans by 2013).119  
Certain plans were grandfathered, which means that they are ex-
cluded from this regulation (and others), but in exchange they can 
make only very limited changes to their benefits and cost-sharing 
structures, or else risk losing grandfathered status.120  However, all 
new plans issued after September 23, 2010,121 must provide first-dollar 
coverage for preventive care, defined as:  (1) “evidence-based items or 
services” that the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force rates “A” or “B”; 
(2) immunizations the Centers for Disease Control  recommends; (3) 
“evidence-informed preventive care” and screenings for children, as 
recommended by the Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA); and (4) additional preventive care and screenings HRSA 
supports for women.122  Examples include screenings for breast, cer-
vical, and colorectal cancer; alcohol-misuse and tobacco-use counsel-
ing; depression screening; and diet counseling for at-risk individu-
als.123  In March 2011, copayments were similarly eliminated for 
certain preventive services for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, 
expanding such policies to an additional population of over 90 mil-
lion people.124
According to the preamble of the recently issued interim final rule 
on preventive services, eliminating cost-sharing for such services is in-
tended to ameliorate their underuse and expected to result in several 
health-related benefits.
  Thus, in sum, PPACA will result in first-dollar coverage 
of preventive services for nearly 170 million Americans by 2013. 
125
 
119 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers, supra 
note 
  Because of high turnover in insurance mar-
90, at 41,732.  This estimate is based on the total number of individuals in non-
grandfathered private health plans by 2013.   
120 PPACA § 1251, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18011 (West Supp. 1B 2010).  The regulations 
concerning what changes are allowable without losing grandfathered status were re-
cently codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.  See Preservation of Right to Main-
tain Existing Coverage, 45 C.F.R. § 147.40 (2010).  For a clear and concise summary of 
grandfathering, see Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform:  Grandfathered Plans, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 15, 2010), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/06/15/ 
implementing-health-reform-grandfathered-plans.   
121 PPACA § 1004(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11 note (West Supp. 1A 2010).   
122 PPACA sec. 1001, § 2713, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13. 
123 See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers, 
supra note 90, at 41,741-43; Howard K. Koh & Kathleen G. Sebelius, Promoting Preven-
tion Through the Affordable Care Act, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1296, 1296-97 (2010).   
124 PPACA §§ 4104–4108, 42 U.S.C.A §§ 1395–1396 (West Supp. 1B 2010); see also 
DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 34, at 71 tbl.C-1 (noting that just over ninety-three 
million Americans had public health insurance in 2009).  
125 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers, supra 
note 90, at 41,733 (“By expanding coverage and eliminating cost sharing for recommend-
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kets, insurers lack incentives to invest in preventive services that might 
have long-term payoff in terms of either cost or customer satisfaction.126  
In addition, as discussed above, individuals underinvest when they must 
pay out-of-pocket costs now for benefits that may accrue only later or 
when they bear costs individually for benefits that accrue to society as a 
whole.127  The regulations state that the intent of the policy is to address 
these market failures to improve health, reduce absence from work or 
school, and possibly save some costs.128  Thus, the reform requires that 
insurance fully cover the expense of preventive services for insureds 
under the belief that doing so will increase use of such services and im-
prove health at large.129
Similarly, the Health Promotion notion of insurance undergirds 
the creation of a category of “essential health benefits” (EHBs).
 
130  
With the creation of EHBs, PPACA defines a federal floor of man-
dated health benefits that all new individual and small-group market 
health plans must now cover, in addition to any existing state man-
dates above this floor.  While Congress left the exact definition of 
what is an EHB to the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), the categories suggest that EHBs are comprehensive in 
scope.131  Further, PPACA directs the Secretary to consider a number 
of factors in defining EHBs, suggesting a vision of health promotion 
that values each individual’s health equally in a nondiscriminatory 
manner.132
 
ed preventive services, these interim final regulations could be expected to increase 
access to and utilization of these services, which are not used at optimal levels today.”). 
  Namely, PPACA requires the Secretary to “take into account 
the health care needs of diverse segments of the population, including 
126 Id. at 41,731.  
127 Id.; see also supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.  
128 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers, supra 
note 90, at 41,733. 
129 For this policy to be effective, insureds must be able to access covered services, 
which requires that doctors be available at a convenient time and place.  In addition, 
regulators have relied on studies that suggest that the particular services identified for 
first-dollar coverage are high value.  See id. at 41,733-34 (explaining anticipated bene-
fits from preventive services based on various studies).  These studies must, of course, 
be correct for this policy to be health-promoting in practice. 
130 PPACA § 1302, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
131 See id. § 1302(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(1) (enumerating categories of es-
sential services, including, but not limited to, emergency services, hospitalization, am-
bulatory services, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance-use-
disorder services, prescription drugs, rehabilitative services, laboratory services, preven-
tive and wellness services, and pediatric services). 
132 Id. § 1302(b)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(1). 
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women, children, persons with disabilities, and other groups.”133  Fur-
thermore, she must “not make coverage decisions, determine reim-
bursement rates, establish incentive programs, or design benefits in 
ways that discriminate against individuals because of their age, disabili-
ty, or expected length of life.”134
PPACA also invests in research that could inform the design of 
Health Promotion insurance coverage and prioritization of treatments, 
based upon determination of relative value.  PPACA supports work in 
“comparative effectiveness research” (CER),
  These requirements not only explicitly 
validate the goals of increasing coverage to promote health but also 
suggest an expansive notion of whose health should be promoted. 
135 a field that aims to de-
termine the relative benefit of medical interventions.136  Over a billion 
dollars in funding was allocated for CER under the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009.137  PPACA establishes a nonprofit non-
governmental entity, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Insti-
tute, to set an agenda for, oversee, and distribute funding for CER.138  
CER seeks to identify the relative benefits of two interventions or treat-
ments, which could then be weighed against their cost differential.139
However, because of objections by those interested in more flexi-
ble medical decisionmaking, the use of such CER studies is con-
strained; for example, PPACA does not require private insurers to use 
CER to determine benefits structures and prohibits its use for Medi-
  
For example, a physician might treat atherosclerosis through angioplas-
ty or open-heart surgery.  CER intends to measure the relative benefit of 
the two approaches for a patient, taking into consideration differences 
among individuals and subpopulations.   
 
133 Id. § 1302(b)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (b)(4)(C). 
134 Id. § 1302(b)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (b)(4)(B). 
135 PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 6301–6302, 124 Stat. 119, 727-47 (to be codi-
fied in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
136 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
MEDICAL TREATMENTS:  ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL ROLE 3-7 (2007), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12-18-ComparativeEffectiveness. 
pdf (providing examples of comparative effectiveness studies).  See generally Lynn M. Ethe-
redge, Creating a High-Performance System for Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH 
AFF. 1761 (2010) (recommending ways to improve comparative effectiveness research 
(CER)); John K. Iglehart, Prioritizing Comparative-Effectiveness Research—IOM Recommen-
dations, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 325 (2009) (discussing the Institute of Medicine’s re-
lease of a “report recommending a portfolio of 100 study topics” for CER). 
137 Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. (2006 
& Supp. III 2009)); see also Iglehart, supra note 136, at 325 (“The ARRA included $1.1 
billion for CER . . . .”).   
138 PPACA sec. 6301, § 1181(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(b) (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
139  See supra note 136 and accompanying text (describing CER). 
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care coverage decisions in a wide range of circumstances, especially 
when considered in conjunction with cost data (i.e., comparative 
value).140
Finally, while not directly related to insurance reform, PPACA calls 
for significant investment in prevention and primary health infra-
structure.  In a recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine, As-
sistant Secretary of Health Howard Koh and Secretary of HHS Kathleen 
Sebelius expressed a belief that the law signals a new era of prevention: 
  To the extent CER results do not influence insurance de-
sign, for CER to translate effectively into practice in a way that drives 
increased value, the research must enable providers to have accurate 
evidence on the relative benefits (and costs) of  interventions and 
practices, and providers must be willing to act on such evidence.  Per-
haps as high of a hurdle, Americans must accept using cost-
effectiveness data to guide rationing decisions.  If a checkup every five 
years yields 80% of the value of annual checkups at 20% of the cost, 
will Americans and their physicians acquiesce to checkups every five 
years?  Or will they pursue the 20% of remaining value from the an-
nual checkups?  PPACA thus sets the stage for more precisely de-
signed Health Promotion insurance through CER, but it does not 
preordain that the results of such research will shape future health 
care financing and delivery. 
Many of the 10 major titles in the law, especially Title IV, Prevention of 
Chronic Diseases and Improving Public Health, advance a prevention 
theme through a wide array of new initiatives and funding.  As a result, 
we believe that the Act will reinvigorate public health on behalf of indi-
viduals, worksites, communities, and the nation at large . . . and will ush-
er in a revitalized era for prevention at every level of society.
141
Some of the goals of prevention will be met through policies that 
bolster primary care delivery structures by increasing reimbursements 
for such care and creating incentives for new physicians to enter into 
the field of primary care.
 
142
 
140 PPACA sec. 6301, § 1182, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1.  For a discussion on imple-
menting the results of CER, see, for example, Aanand D. Naik & Laura A. Petersen, 
The Neglected Purpose of Comparative-Effectiveness Research, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1929 
(2009), and James C. Robinson, Comparative Effectiveness Research:  From Clinical Informa-
tion to Economic Incentives, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1788, 1792-93 (2010).  PPACA also raised 
concerns that developing generalized rules might undermine both consideration of 
variable patient responses and physician autonomy.  See John K. Iglehart, The Political 
Fight over Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1757, 1757-59 (2010) (ex-
plaining how CER sent “conservative pundits . . . into rhetorical overdrive”).      
  Through these investments in public 
141 Koh & Sebelius, supra note 123, at 1296. 
142 See Kevin Sack, Health Care Wastefulness Is Detailed in Studies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2010, at A15.  
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health and primary care infrastructure and the abovementioned cov-
erage expansions for preventive care and EHBs, PPACA intends to 
reform health care insurance and delivery systems in a way justified by 
a Health Promotion theory of insurance, even to the extent doing so 
might undermine other visions of insurance within the law, as dis-
cussed below in Section III.D. 
B.  Financial Security 
Everyone understands the extraordinary hardships that are placed on 
the uninsured, who live every day just one accident or illness away from 
bankruptcy. 
President Barack Obama
143
The underinsured are a critical group . . . . In some cases 53 percent 
don’t know they’re underinsured.  So they either have a huge co-pay if 
the problem happens or the deductibles being [sic] so high they might 
as well not have insurance.  
 
Senator Chris Dodd (D, CT)
144
1.  Theory 
 
An alternate view that captured the imagination of scholars, policy-
makers, and the public and that wove strongly through reform debates 
is that insurance should primarily serve to protect against risks to 
wealth.  Stated otherwise, the goal of health insurance is to prevent 
the costs of medical care from causing financial insecurity.145
 
143 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Health Care Reform, supra 
note 
  This Fi-
nancial Security vision of insurance underlies other key PPACA poli-
cies, including the elimination of policy limits, a cap on cost sharing 
63.  
144 Michelle Miller, 25 Million Have Health Insurance But Not Enough, 
CBSNEWS.COM (July 26, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/26/ 
eveningnews/main5189708.shtml.  
145 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 
53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 959 (1963) (“If we think of utility as attached to income, then 
the costs of medical care act as a random deduction from this income, and it is the ex-
pected value of the utility of income after medical costs that we are concerned with.”); 
see also supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (introducing the Financial Security 
theory).  Policymakers and scholars often propose catastrophic plans to translate this 
idea into practice.  While a logical extension of the theory to the extent they protect 
individuals from especially high expenditures and reduce moral hazard, these plans 
have been criticized for causing health insecurity in practice by imposing high deduc-
tibles and cost-sharing on low- and middle-income workers unable to manage such 
costs.  See HACKER, supra note 14, at 149-53 (describing plans to cut back insurance 
coverage to encourage efficient and cost-effective use of medical services). 
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for all insureds, and subsidies of premiums for lower income Ameri-
cans, as discussed below.146
This model differs from a Health Promotion model in two key 
ways.  First, this model has a more flexible notion of what services a 
policy might cover.  While the Health Promotion model relies on a 
particular insurance design that creates incentives for the use of high-
value interventions, a Financial Security model can be more laissez 
faire about the particular design of a policy.  To be meaningful, health 
insurance policies must still provide a baseline of coverage and access 
to medical care that likely would have similarities to the coverage of-
fered in a Health Promotion model of insurance.
  Although many interested in insurance as 
protection against financial risk would certainly also expect that insur-
ance promote health, the difference is that, for them, the primary goal 
that defines priorities for redistribution and drives resource allocation 
decisions is prevention of financial insecurity.  Under this theory, in-
surance is thus a mechanism to pool and redistribute costs of care that 
would cause the insured undue financial burden. 
147  But policies could 
be designed with more variability around and above this baseline, even 
among policies with the same price and actuarial value.148
The second and more significant difference concerns the alloca-
tion of insurance dollars.  Regardless of what a policy covers, at what 
point will it indemnify losses?  In this second model, expenses are in-
demnified based on whether they pose a significant financial threat, 
not necessarily based on the relative value of the services for promot-
ing health.
  For exam-
ple, one policy might privilege greater certainty, covering more expen-
sive diagnostic care in the case of injury or illness.  Another might favor 
health care choice or geographical flexibility.  Another could cover he-
roic end-of-life care instead of preventive care.  All of these emphases 
are consistent with a Financial Security approach, and insureds could 
choose insurance protection that indemnifies the types of losses and 
pays for the types of care most important to the insureds themselves. 
149
 
146 See infra notes 
  Even if a Financial Security policy covered preventive 
care or early detection screening, it would prioritize indemnifying the 
178-93 and accompanying text.  
147 This baseline is particularly important to the degree it defines the contours of 
policies that are subsidized.  Otherwise, “affordable” could translate into poor coverage 
and increased risks of financial vulnerability from out-of-pocket medical care costs 
down the line.       
148 Others could choose to buy into more comprehensive policies.  They would 
simply pay more for such coverage if they valued it and could afford it. 
149 Such a policy, however, will in all likelihood also pay for many high-value services. 
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costs of using such care only once such use becomes unaffordable to 
the insured.  Furthermore, a Financial Security policy is likely to in-
demnify more flat-of-the-curve spending.150
Scholars, politicians, and others in popular discourse have ad-
vanced this notion of health insurance both explicitly and implicitly.  
In their 1999 book True Security, Professors Michael Graetz and Jerry 
Mashaw advocate for an American social insurance system that pro-
vides Americans with security against a life cycle of risks to income.
  Catastrophic spending—
which poses the most obvious financial threat—likely falls on the flat 
of the curve in some instances because it is so expensive that the dol-
lar per benefit is lower than for other less expensive, and equally, or 
even less, beneficial interventions.   
151  
Graetz and Mashaw write that social insurance should “be designed to 
protect income adequacy and to support income stability in the face 
of large and unpredictable medical expenses, as well as to guard 
against loss of income due to illness.”152 They identify two major 
threats against which insurance should provide a cushion:  high costs 
of medical treatment and a possible loss of wages during recovery 
from illness or injury.153
Although Graetz and Mashaw are particularly concerned with so-
cial insurance, a rich literature has developed to expose how and con-
tend that private insurance has failed to provide sufficient financial 
security in a number of ways.
  Thus, according to Graetz and Mashaw, 
health insurance should distribute the costs of expensive medical 
treatment, especially large and unpredictable medical expenses, that 
would threaten income adequacy or security. 
154  Some of the most prominent academ-
ic work in this vein is a series of studies by Professors David Himmels-
tein, Elizabeth Warren, Deborah Thorne, and Steffie Woolhandler, 
which suggests that medical care expenses are a cause of bankruptcy 
in a significant number of bankruptcy filings.155
 
150 For more information on “flat-of-the-curve” spending, see supra note 
  While some of the 
subjects in these studies were uninsured, three-quarters of those filing 
for medical bankruptcy, according to one study, were actually insured 
69 and 
accompanying text. 
151 GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 13. 
152 Id. at 170. 
153 Id.   
154 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
155 See Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury, supra note 14, at W5-70 (“[M]edical 
problems contribute to about half of all bankruptcies.”); Himmelstein et al., Medical 
Bankruptcy, supra note 14, at 743 (finding that “[i]llness or medical bills contributed to 
62.1% of all bankruptcies in 2007”). 
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at the time of filing, which suggests that private coverage—as currently 
designed—is insufficient to provide income security.156  Melissa Jacoby 
and Mirya Holman build on this work by showing that prior studies 
underestimated medically related bankruptcies because they relied on 
court records that categorized credit card debt and mortgage debt as 
nonmedical, even if this debt were incurred to pay for medical care.157  
Using a similar approach to study foreclosures, another study found 
medical costs were a key driver of foreclosures, even for the insured.158
Finally, Jacob Hacker has documented what he calls the “Great 
Risk Shift”—namely the increasing financial risk that Americans have 
faced over the past several decades due, in part, to rising medical costs 
in conjunction with the design of private insurance, which causes 
Americans to bear more of these costs.
  
While bankruptcy can be an efficient way to address financial trouble 
in a limited scope, the above studies imply that the current level of 
medical bankruptcy and foreclosure in the United States is a problem 
caused in part by insufficient insurance coverage. 
159  He argues that this trend of 
“risk privatization,” in contrast to “risk socialization,” has occurred 
through policy drift, whereby “otherwise stable policies” have resulted 
in greater insecurity in light of changing circumstances.160  For exam-
ple, he attributes a rising trend of uninsurance to the cost of medical 
care “outstripping” wage growth, making it impossible for workers and 
employers to finance insurance.161
 
156 Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy, supra note 
  In the face of high medical-cost 
growth and lower wage growth, even policies that on their face do not 
change become unaffordable.  Paying just for premiums (regardless of 
medical care use) might create concerns of financial insecurity.  The 
theme of all of these studies is that Americans—even those with insur-
ance—are at high and unacceptable levels of financial risk due to 
costs of health insurance and medical spending.  Impliedly, policies 
14, at 743. 
157 Jacoby & Holman, supra note 14, at 242. 
158 See Christopher Tarver Robertson et al., Get Sick, Get Out:  The Medical Causes of 
Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 66 (2008) (stating that up to 1.5 mil-
lion Americans are at risk of losing their homes due to medical costs). 
159 HACKER, supra note 14, at 7.  But see Jonathan Gruber & Helen Levy, The Evolu-
tion of Medical Spending Risk, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2009, at 25, 44 (“Our bottom line is 
that health spending risk facing a typical household has not increased much, if at all, 
since 1980.”).   
160 HACKER, supra note 14, at 248-49. 
161 Id. at 252-53 (citing Richard Kronick & Todd Gilmer, Explaining the Decline in 
Health Insurance Coverage, 1979–1995, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 1999, at 30). 
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better designed to protect Americans against these harms are there-
fore key to financial security. 
Translating this theory into insurance policy design requires con-
sideration of two types of spending.  First, insurance based upon the Fi-
nancial Security notion would aim to cabin out-of-pocket spending on 
medical care once such spending might make someone financially in-
secure.  Individuals incur several types of out-of-pocket costs when they 
use medical care.  For example, they pay for cost-sharing requirements 
(like deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments) under an insurance 
policy for treatments not covered by insurance and for care beyond pol-
icy limits.  Such costs may be substantial if the insured is very sick, se-
riously injured, or not well insured, contributing to bankruptcy and fo-
reclosure, as noted above.  Under a Financial Security approach, an 
insured would be expected to contribute to medical expenses to the ex-
tent affordable.162  Such a policy reduces moral hazard.  In other words, 
by paying some of the costs of the care they use, insureds have greater 
incentives to reduce unnecessary use of medical care.163
Again, as in the case of Health Promotion insurance, this theory 
could be interpreted into policy in various ways.  Advocates of this ap-
proach could draw lines and design coverage differently depending on 
what they consider to constitute “financial insecurity.”  Financial inse-
curity could be measured by a shock to disposable income available af-
ter medical care costs or by depletion to assets.  It could be gauged over 
a short time frame, or over multiple years, or over a lifetime. 
  But at the 
point that medical care costs pose financial risk, insurance would begin 
to indemnify spending.  Second, according to Financial Security no-
tions, premiums for policies with meaningful coverage must be afforda-
ble in the first place.  Depending on an individual’s income and wealth, 
even routine premium contributions may be unmanageable.  Thus, en-
suring financial security requires consideration of both out-of-pocket 
spending on care and on premium contributions. 
 
162 Cf. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 13, at 174 (“Because this system guarantees 
against larger than bearable individual or family medical expenditures, the primary 
funding source—the first payor—for medical care will be individuals.”).  
163 While requiring insureds to contribute to medical care out of pocket might 
curb unnecessary spending, the concomitant risk is that some will underuse valuable 
health services.  As revealed by the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, when they 
are required to pay for medical care, some individuals will forgo care, even when this 
forbearance is not in their best interests.  The study showed people were as likely to 
forgo highly cost-effective care as marginally cost-effective care.  GRUBER, supra note 
106, at 4. 
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Graetz and Mashaw suggest a two-part test to measure financial in-
security:  the risk of falling below a “decent” income level and the risk 
of an “unacceptably steep decline in living standards” due to large 
medical expenses.164  The first requires determining what constitutes a 
decent income level below which an individual would neither be ex-
pected to pay premiums for insurance nor share in the costs of medi-
cal care.  Above that decent income level, an insured would contribute 
to insurance premiums and medical costs, perhaps on a sliding-scale 
basis adjusted to keep an insured from slipping back under a line of 
decent income after making premium payments.  One could also con-
sider decent income over a longer time period, factoring in an ability 
to borrow to cover expenses that are unaffordable this year but could 
be financed through future earnings.165  Furthermore, one could con-
sider medical expenses in light of total household expenses, based on 
factors such as geographic cost of living, family size, or nonmedical 
debt that might make shifting dollars to medical care easier for one 
household than for another.166
A measure of financial security becomes much more complicated if 
a decline in living standards can constitute insecurity.  A decline might 
be measured, for example, based on what share of income individuals 
devote to medical care expenses or based on depletion of assets.  If 
10% were the standard, for example, someone who earns $40,000 per 
year would have to spend $4000 out of pocket before becoming “inse-
cure,” while someone who earns $300,000 would have to spend 
$30,000.  Or higher earners might be required to spend a higher per-
  PPACA premium subsidies, as dis-
cussed below, follow a simple version of this approach by determining 
affordability based upon annual income. 
 
164 GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 13, at 171. 
165 Looking at annual income, costs may appear unaffordable.  But looking only at 
one year may be myopic.  If someone could finance high medical care costs this year 
from a one-time shock (e.g., a heart attack or an accident) over the next few years 
through a loan, this shock might not be deemed to create financial vulnerability.  
Likewise, if premiums are unaffordable this year for someone whose income will sky-
rocket next year when she finishes school and begins work, perhaps she should borrow 
to finance this year’s premiums.  If measured over a longer time horizon, costs would 
constitute a valid threat to financial security only when a shock is large enough that an 
insured (1) cannot afford to finance it through a loan, even considering future in-
come; (2) cannot obtain credit at a manageable rate; or (3) cannot shift costs forward 
because they are recurring at a level high enough (e.g., chronic disease) to pose persis-
tent financial risk.   
166 The federal poverty level tables, for example, take family size into account.  See 
Delayed Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines for the Remainder of 2010, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 45,628, 45,629 (Aug. 3, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES].   
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centage of income before they are deemed “insecure.”  Under a pure 
income test, an heiress earning $40,000 a year would receive subsidies 
if under the income threshold (as, in fact, would be true in the case of 
PPACA’s subsidy policy on its face167) but would certainly not if assets 
were considered.  Taking assets into account would provide greater 
precision but would be nearly impossible to administer, requiring a 
more nuanced way to account for the presence and depletion of non-
income assets for all Americans.168
In sum, translating a Financial Security theory into policy requires 
defining financial security so that insurance can be designed to ensure 
that no one risks compromised financial security due to medical care 
costs.  While supporters of this theory might disagree on what exactly 
constitutes financial insecurity, the thread that defines this theory and 
unites its supporters is a belief that, at its core, health insurance 
should primarily serve to protect financial security, however defined, 
by pooling and redistributing costs that might otherwise compromise 
any individual’s security. 
 
2.  Financial Security Policies of PPACA 
This Financial Security conception of health insurance informs 
several of the key PPACA policies that cabin possible financial expo-
sure from medical care expenses and premium costs.  For example, 
PPACA requires that all health plans limit total annual cost-sharing 
obligations.169  These limits are defined according to the Internal Rev-
enue Code section on out-of-pocket maximum allowable amounts for 
high-deductible health plans,170 which were $5950 for individual cov-
erage and $11,900 for family coverage in 2010, adjusted annually for 
cost of living.171
 
167
 PPACA § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
  Because of the broad application of these cost-sharing 
limits to all plans, including self-insured plans, this rule will benefit all 
168 Assets are already considered, however, in the provision of Medicaid in most 
states.  For example, to the extent that someone with a low income has spent down her 
assets and needs long-term care, she will qualify for Medicaid in most states.  For 
background on Medicaid eligibility, see Medicaid Eligibility Overview, CENTERS FOR MEDI-
CARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/medicaideligibility/01_overview.asp 
(last modified Nov. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Medicaid Eligibility Overview]. 
169 PPACA § 1302(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(c) (West Supp. 1B 2010).  
170 See PPACA § 1302(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(c); see also I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii) 
(2006). 
171 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NO. 969, HEALTH SAVINGS 
ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX-FAVORED HEALTH PLANS 3 (2010), available at http:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p969.pdf.  
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insureds.  This means that all annual out-of-pocket insured medical 
care expenses above these levels will be financed by insurance and dis-
tributed among members of an insurance pool. 
This rule relies upon a blunt definition of financial security, ra-
ther than on one of the more nuanced approaches discussed above.172  
Instead of tailoring unacceptable out-of-pocket exposure based on in-
dividual income or assets, it applies an across-the-board policy that no 
one should spend more than a certain set amount per year, out of 
pocket, on care.173  While more administrable, such a policy errs in the 
direction of providing excessive security for some and risking insuffi-
cient security for others, depending on how one defines financial se-
curity.  Consider how this policy applies to the average U.S. household.  
According to the U.S. Census, the median household income in 2009 
was just over $50,000, a slight decrease from 2008.174  In 2010, the aver-
age employee premium contribution for family ESI coverage was 
$4000,175 about 8% of household income.176  If the family has signifi-
cant medical care needs in a year and incurs $11,900 in cost sharing, it 
would spend nearly a third of annual household income on medical 
expenses.177
An additional key Financial Security policy is the creation of slid-
ing-scale tax subsidies for insurance premiums and sliding-scale cost-
sharing obligations for those who buy insurance in the individual 
  These limits thus lessen financial exposure, as intended, 
but still require meaningful contribution to medical care costs. 
 
172 See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text. 
173 Care not covered by a policy would fall outside of these limits. 
174 AMANDA NOSS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NO. ACSBR 09-2, HOUSEHOLD INCOME FOR 
STATES:  2008–2009, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/ 
acsbr09-2.pdf. 
175 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EM-
PLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS:  2010 ANNUAL SURVEY 76 (2010) [hereinafter KFF & HRET 
2010 SURVEY], available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2010/8085.pdf. 
176 Because the population that is offered employer-sponsored insurance is likely 
to have a higher median income than the U.S. median of $50,000, the average percen-
tage of income paid for premiums might be slightly lower.  In addition, the KFF & 
HRET Survey reports only averages, not medians, so the median premium price, which 
would provide a better apples-to-apples comparison, might be either higher or lower 
than $4000.  Nonetheless, 8% is a ballpark estimate.    
177 Furthermore, out-of-pocket limits apply only to what the plan covers.  If any fami-
ly member needs care that falls outside of the scope of the policy, an insured must 
finance such care completely out of pocket.  If a family incurred such costs in any one 
year, it might be able to finance them over a number of years.  However, if such costs recur 
due to chronic disease or other long-term health problems, they might be unaffordable.   
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market.178  These premium subsidies, the details of which were hotly 
debated, were finalized in HCERA, which increased the scope of sub-
sidies from the initial Senate bill.179  The subsidies are designed so that 
someone earning up to 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL) is ex-
pected to spend only a certain percentage of income on premiums, 
ranging from 2% of income for someone earning 133% of the FPL to 
9.5% of income for someone earning 300% to 400% of the FPL.180  
Subsidies are calculated based on the difference between the pre-
mium price for a plan and the percentage of income an individual is 
expected to spend.  Because premiums vary based on the richness of 
benefits, subsidies are determined based on an average plan pre-
mium, defined as the second-lowest-cost “silver level” plan in the re-
gion (i.e., plans with an actuarial value of 70% or higher).181  For ex-
ample, an individual who earns $1210 a month (or $14,520 a year) 
earns just above 133% of the FPL.182  She is expected to spend 3% of 
her income on premiums, or about $36 per month.  If the silver level 
plan in her region costs $200 per month, she is eligible for $164 in 
premium support.183
 
178 See HCERA, sec. 1001(a), § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 
1A 2010); PPACA § 1402, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071 (West  Supp. 1B 2010).   
  As she earns more, she contributes more, based 
upon the presumption that she can do so without becoming financially 
insecure.  These premium credits are generously indexed to reflect 
excess premium growth over income growth, so that their impact will 
179 The House Bill provided more generous subsidies than the Senate Bill.  See 
Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. §§ 342–344 (as 
passed by the House on Nov. 7, 2009).  The level of subsidies was a significant stick-
ing point toward the end of the legislative process.  HCERA struck a compromise by 
increasing the potential subsidies so that, in some cases, the subsidies are now more 
generous in the final law than in the House Bill.  See HCERA sec. 1001(a), § 1401(a), 
26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1A 2010).  For a side-by-side comparison of 
premium subsidies in the House and Senate Bills, see SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, PUB. NO. 1343, THE HEALTH INSURANCE PROVISIONS OF THE 
2009 CONGRESSIONAL HEALTH REFORM BILLS:  IMPLICATIONS FOR COVERAGE, AFFOR-
DABILITY, AND COSTS, at ix, exhibit ES-1 (2010), available at http:// 
www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Jan/
Coverage%20Report/1343_Collins_cong_bills_coverage_report_172010.pdf. 
180 HCERA sec. 1001(a), § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 36(b)(3)(A).  
181 See PPACA § 1302(d)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1B 
2010) (defining a silver level plan); id. § 1401, 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(2) (West Supp. 1A 
2010) (defining the calculation of the “premium assistance credit amount”).   
182 See 2010 HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 166, at 45,629. 
183 HCERA sec. 1001(a)(1), § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(3)(A).  This pre-
sumes that her plan covers only the essential health benefits and does not include ad-
ditional state requirements, the cost of which are excluded for the calculation of tax 
credits.  See PPACA § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(3)(D).   
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not erode in future years with medical cost inflation.184  This adjustment 
will be considerable if the trend of the U.S. premium’s growth above 
inflation levels continues.  From 2000 to 2009, ESI premiums grew an 
average of 5.1% per year, as compared to a 0.7% wage growth.185
Additionally, for those who earn between 100% and 400% of the 
FPL and who buy a silver plan through a state exchange, or clearing-
house set up under the law for the sale of insurance,
 
186 the law further 
lowers the cost-sharing limits discussed above.  For example, the lim-
its for someone earning 200% to 300% of the FPL are half the limits 
discussed above (or just under $3000 per individual and $6000 per 
family).187
These premium tax credits and reduced cost-sharing provide sig-
nificant protection against financial risk to those who buy insurance 
on an exchange, but the policy’s design limits this protection in two 
regards.  First, subsidies are available only for policies bought on a 
state exchange, not for insureds with ESI.  To prevent employees from 
declining plans offered by employers so that they can buy subsidized 
policies on the exchange instead, the law does not authorize subsidies 
to anyone who has access to “affordable” and adequate minimum es-
sential coverage through other sources.
 
188  Such coverage is deemed 
unaffordable only if premiums cost over 9.5% of income and inade-
quate if the actuarial value of the plan is less than 60%.189  This limita-
tion means that someone whose employer offers coverage might re-
main more financially vulnerable than a similarly situated individual 
whose employer does not offer coverage.190
 
184 HCERA sec. 1001(a)(1)(B), § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(ii)(I). 
  Thus, these limits provide 
relief to the family discussed above at risk of spending one-third of 
gross income on medical expenses, but only if this family is among the 
185 Wage growth is calculated net of the employee’s share of health benefits.  See 
Christina Romer & Mark Duggan, Exploring the Link Between Rising Health Insurance Pre-
miums and Stagnant Wages, COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS (Mar. 12, 2010, 12:17 PM), http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/12/exploring-link-between-rising-health-insurance-
premiums-and-stagnant-wages.   
186 By January 1, 2014, each state is required to establish an “exchange” to facilitate 
the purchase of insurance by individuals and small groups.  PPACA § 1311(b), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 18031(b) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
187 Id. § 1402(c)(1)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. 18071(c)(1)(A).  
188 Id. § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
189 HCERA sec. 1001(a)(2), § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 36B(c)(2)(C)(i)–(ii).   
190 There is speculation as to whether employers will drop coverage so that em-
ployees can buy through exchanges, despite the penalties these employees would face 
through the employer mandate.  Conversation with Amy Monahan, Professor, Univ. of 
Minn. Law Sch. (Sept. 27, 2010).  
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minority of American families who will obtain coverage on an ex-
change, rather than through an employer.191  In addition, by using a 
silver plan to set subsidies, PPACA effectively determines that once tax 
dollars are used to bolster financial security in the face of medical ex-
penses through subsidies, the level of protection is defined with re-
spect to services covered under an average silver plan.  Under this pol-
icy, if someone invests in uncovered services, she does so at her own 
financial peril.  Lifting the ESI restrictions or allowing subsidies for 
“platinum plans” (i.e., plans with an actuarial value of 90% or high-
er192) would enhance the reach of financial protection under the law 
to spending on more coverage or services.  But doing so would also 
increase the total cost of subsidies and could draw funds toward ensur-
ing financial security and away from competing policy goals.193
Another security-enhancing policy, which became effective on 
September 23, 2010, is the prohibition of lifetime insurance policy 
limits and a gradually phased-in elimination of annual limits on “es-
sential benefits.”
 
194  A health plan could previously cap the total losses 
the policy would cover, either annually or in total over the lifetime of 
the policy for a subscriber.  According to one study, prior to PPACA, 
about 55% of employer plans were subject to lifetime spending limits, 
most commonly set at $1 million or $2 million.195  Furthermore, at the 
time of the study, approximately 20,000 to 25,000 individuals had ex-
ceeded these limits in their current health plans.196
 
191 Someone eligible for employer-sponsored insurance that is deemed unafforda-
ble will also be eligible. 
  This means that 
these individuals had already incurred over $1 million or $2 million in 
covered medical care over the lifetime of a currently held plan.  Such 
individuals presumably have significant health needs if they have ex-
ceeded the limit in the first place.  Once they exceed policy limits, 
they must pay for all additional medical care costs out of pocket.  
192 PPACA § 1302(d)(1)(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(d)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
193 This is not completely true to the extent that subsidies are provided for insur-
ance that covers EHBs, which might also advance Health Promotion goals.  For a de-
scription of EHBs, see id. § 1302(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b). 
194 PPACA sec. 1001, § 2711, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11(a) (West Supp. 1A 2010).  For 
the effective date, see id. § 1004(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11 note.   
195 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE IMPACT OF LIFETIME LIMITS 1 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.hemophilia.org/docs/LifetimeLimitsReport.pdf. 
196 Id. 
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These types of limits had previously created the potential for signifi-
cant financial insecurity among a small, very sick population.197
The lifetime limits apply uniformly to all individual and group 
health plans, including grandfathered and self-insured plans, and the 
annual limits apply to all but grandfathered plans.  Self-insured plans 
are a type of ESI where the employer retains the risk for losses.
 
198  Over 
half of ESI plans are now self-insured.199  These plans are exempted 
from state insurance regulation because of federal preemption under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)200 and 
are also exempted from some of the new PPACA requirements.201
Symbolically, the application of these prohibitions to such plans is 
meaningful.  In practice, these rules might be more circumscribed.  
They apply only to spending on EHBs—the new set of federally man-
dated benefits discussed above—not to all covered benefits.
   
202
 
197 Again, because this policy is income-blind, it could possibly cushion some costs 
for people who could afford them.  However, medical spending at these levels is likely 
to create financial insecurity for most American families.   
  This 
means, first, that any benefits that are not considered EHBs can still 
198 Insurers generally buy reinsurance policies to protect themselves from such risk. 
199 KFF & HRET 2010 SURVEY, supra note 175, at 154.  
200 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006) (stating that an employee benefits plan 
may not be “deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer” and thus is exempt 
from state insurance regulations).    
201 While there has been some confusion regarding which PPACA regulations ap-
ply to self-insured plans, the consensus emerging among regulators and academics is 
that any regulations that apply to a “group health plan” and do not explicitly exempt 
self-insured plans apply to them.  According to the interim final regulations,  
The term ‘group health plan’ is used in title XXVII of the PHS Act, part 7 of 
ERISA, and chapter 100 of the Code, and is distinct from the term ‘health 
plan,’ as used in other provisions of title I of the Affordable Care Act.  The 
term ‘health plan’ does not include self-insured group health plans.   
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to 
Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,539 n.1 ( June 17, 2010).  This means that “group health 
plan” includes self-insured plans but that “health plan” does not in order to maintain 
consistency with the other laws that PPACA amends.  Id.  Tim Jost makes a slightly differ-
ent argument, based on an internal reading of PPACA that is logical only if “group health 
plan” includes self-insured plans.  See Tim Jost, How Does the Health Reform Legislation Af-
fect Self-Insured Plans?, LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REF.:  AN O’NEILL INST. BLOG 
(Mar. 31, 2010, 5:24 PM), http://oneillhealthreform.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/ 
how-does-the-health-reform-legislation-affect-self-insured-plans.  Even with this more 
inclusive interpretation, several important aspects of the insurance regulations, such as 
coverage of “essential health benefits” discussed in Section III.A, do not apply to self-
insured plans.   
202 PPACA secs. 1001(5), 10101, § 2711(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11(b) (West Supp. 
1A 2010).  
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have spending limits.  Second, some employers can choose not to cov-
er EHBs to avoid unbounded coverage.  Both self-insured plans and 
grandfathered plans, which make up a majority of private health 
plans, are not required to cover these EHBs.203  Even though the cate-
gories of EHBs describe services that ESI plans typically have cov-
ered,204 self-insured employers could end coverage of certain EHBs if 
they deemed it too expensive to include such coverage without limits 
as a backstop on total plan exposure.205  To the extent that self-
insuring grows to avoid coverage of EHBs, the restriction on plan lim-
its could directly undermine the goal of the limits, as well as the goal 
of mandating coverage of EHBs.206  Despite these potential short-
comings in application, the clear intent and the likely outcome of 
these policies is to reduce financial insecurity from “underinsurance,” 
particularly for the chronically ill, in the face of catastrophically high 
costs by requiring health plans to cover and thus distribute any indi-
vidual’s excessively high medical care costs among all insureds.207
Finally, while not part of the private insurance reforms, the expan-
sion of Medicaid is worth brief mention because increased eligibility for 
coverage strongly protects against financial exposure.  Prior to reform, 
only certain populations, such as children, parents, and pregnant 
women who met financial criteria, were eligible for most states’ Medi-
caid programs.
 
208  This “categorical eligibility” has been lifted so that 
anyone who earns below 133% of the FPL is now eligible.209
 
203 See PPACA § 1302(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(a) (West Supp. 1B 2010); see also supra 
note 
  In addi-
tion, while, prior to reform, states had significant discretion over how 
much of the eligible population they would cover, they are, post-
201 (explaining why § 1302(a),  applying to “any health plan,” does not include 
such plans).  Coverage of some of these services is required elsewhere in PPACA.  For 
example, self-insured (but not grandfathered) plans must cover preventive services under 
section 1001.  PPACA sec. 1001, § 2713, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (West Supp. 1A 2010) . 
204 In fact, PPACA directs the Secretary of HHS to review benefits in employer-
sponsored plans to help define “essential health benefits.”  Id. § 1302(b)(4), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(4) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
205 A grandfathered plan would, however, lose its grandfathered status if it made 
substantial changes to coverage, subjecting it then to the essential health benefits rules.  
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.9815–1251T(g)(1)(i) (2010).    
206 See infra subsection II.D.2. 
207 Again, this conception of financial security does not address either income or 
assets.  It caps exposure for someone who might be able to afford the out-of-pocket 
costs as well as for someone who might not.  Presumably, this overinclusiveness may be 
more of a conceptual problem, though, since few people could manage costs at these 
high levels. 
208 See generally Medicaid Eligibility Overview, supra note 168. 
209 PPACA § 2001(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(i). 
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reform, required to offer Medicaid to anyone who meets federal eligi-
bility rules—a requirement that in part spurred states’ legal challenges 
to the law.210  To preserve access to providers in light of the coverage 
expansion, PPACA has funded increased Medicaid reimbursements 
for primary care services211 and the training of additional primary care 
physicians.212  Thus, the new Medicaid enrollees, to the extent they 
can access medical care,213
In sum, the above policies constitute core elements of health 
reform aimed at reducing Americans’ financial exposure to medical 
care costs.  These policies do not, however, eliminate such exposure.  
They are circumscribed in large part due to funding constraints, and 
they define financial insecurity in rigid, bright-line ways.  If Financial 
Security goals were the primary focus of the law, we might see more re-
sources devoted to these policies, both to fund subsidies and to draw 
more refined definitions of financial security.  For example, more mon-
ey might be allocated to tax credits for premiums and cost sharing so 
that anyone earning under 400% of the FPL would be eligible, even if 
her insurance were through an employer rather than a state exchange.  
Or additional dollars could be spent on Medicaid expansion or en-
hanced reimbursements for providers participating in the Medicaid 
program.  Or the out-of-pocket limits could be designed on a sliding 
scale based upon income and assets.  But such emphasis on protecting 
insureds against vulnerability to medical care costs might be partly at 
 will be able to obtain it with meaningful 
protection from financial exposure. 
 
210 See generally Sara Rosenbaum, A “Customary and Necessary” Program—Medicaid and 
Health Care Reform, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1952 (2010) (“Claiming that the law ‘converts 
what had been a voluntary federal-state partnership into a compulsory top-down federal 
program in which the discretion of [states] is removed,’ the lawsuit attempts to portray 
states as compelled . . . .”(alteration in Rosenbaum) (quoting Complaint at 5, State of 
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091 (D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010))). 
211 HCERA sec. 1202(a)(1), § 2303(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396.  
212 PPACA § 5301, 42 U.S.C.A. § 293k (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
213 Some criticize the quality of access available through this coverage because 
some physicians will not accept the low reimbursement rates under some states’ Medi-
caid programs, as well as because of a general shortage and uneven geographical dis-
tribution of primary care physicians.  See, e.g., KATHRYN NIX, THE HERITAGE FOUND., 
WEBMEMO NO. 2873, OBAMACARE:  IMPACT ON THE UNINSURED 1 (2010), http:// 
report.heritage.org/wm2873 (noting that doctors refuse Medicaid patients due to 
reimbursement concerns); Robert Pear, Doctor Shortage Proves Obstacle to Obama Goals, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, at A1 (“The need for more doctors comes up at almost every 
Congressional hearing and White House forum on health care.”).  Massachusetts saw 
significant access problems with expanded coverage.  See MASS. MED. SOC’Y, PHYSICIAN 
WORKFORCE STUDY 2-3 (2010) (describing physician shortages, particularly in primary 
care and internal medicine). 
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the expense of other goals, as explored in Section III.C below.  Thus, 
the law simultaneously adopts significant Financial Security policies and 
also constrains their reach and the amount of effort necessary to im-
plement them. 
C.  Brute Luck 
So, self-responsibility is going to be critical. . . . [E]very business out 
there is going to be looking at their health care bottom line.  And in-
creasingly what you’re going to see is that businesses are going to incen-
tivize their employees to stop smoking, lose weight, get exercise, get reg-
ular checkups. . . . [T]he American people are going to have to 
participate in their own health. 
President Barack Obama
214
We can build a health care system that is more responsive to our needs 
and is delivered to more people at lower cost.  The “solution” . . . resides 
where every important social advance has always resided—with the 
American people themselves, with well informed American families mak-
ing practical decisions to address their imperatives for better health and 
more secure prosperity.  The engine of our prosperity and progress has 
always been our freedom and the sense of responsibility for and control 
of our own destiny that freedom requires.   
 
Senator John McCain  (R, AZ)
215
This summer, those are the principles that will guide us.  And our desti-
nation is a country in which no one will ever have coverage denied be-
cause of pre-existing conditions . . . a country in which no one will ever 
again suffer financial disaster because they had the bad luck to get sick. 
 
Congressman Steny Hoyer (D, MD)
216
1.  Theory 
 
The final dominant American conception of health insurance that 
shaped key PPACA policies, including new insurance-rate regulation 
and wellness-program discounts, is that insurance should primarily 
mitigate losses that an insured should not reasonably foresee and fore-
 
214 Nancy Snyderman, Obama on Health Care Policy:  “No Free Lunch,” MSNBC.COM 
( July 16, 2009, 9:04:56 A.M.), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31929715/ns/health-
health_care. 
215 John McCain, Better Care at Lower Cost for Every American, CONTINGENCIES, Sept.–
Oct. 2008, at 28, 31, available at http://www.contingencies.org/septoct08/mccain.pdf.  
216 Press Release, Representative Steny Hoyer, Hoyer Gives Remarks on the 43rd 
Anniversary of Medicare ( July 1, 2009), available at http://hoyer.house.gov/index. 
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1700&Itemid=57.     
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stall.217  This notion of insurance appeals to a sense of personal re-
sponsibility that has long informed American public policy.218  Michele 
Landis Dauber has described how “narratives of blame and fate” 
shaped determinations of who was worthy of disaster relief throughout 
the nineteenth century.219  She further contends that these early  
disaster-relief narratives informed the rhetoric underlying the New 
Deal and American welfare state.220  Beyond the United States, in stu-
dies in Belgium, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, and the United Kingdom, a 
majority of those surveyed expressed a willingness to ration health 
care with sensitivity to personal responsibility.221
Some advocates of this approach argue that it is most consistent 
with other forms of liability insurance that carve out coverage of in-
tentional harms or charge policyholders more for negligence or for  
other risky conditions they create or accept, which increase the like-
lihood of harm.
 
222
 
217 See supra notes 
  For example, homeowners’ insurance pays for 
damages from an accidental fire, but not from one the policyholder 
sets intentionally.  Further, an insurer will charge more for a policy to 
insure a home that is far from a fire hydrant or made of materials that 
are more flammable because these conditions increase the risk of fire 
or the potential extent of losses in the case of a fire.  The price of an 
automobile insurance policy likewise increases after a policyholder is 
19-22 and accompanying text (introducing this theory).  Note 
that this theory creates incentives for information acquisition and risk avoidance:  if a 
behavior is considered a health risk, insureds are expected both to know that this be-
havior is a risk and to avoid it.  
218 See, e.g., Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and “Natural” Disaster Relief:  Nar-
rating the American Welfare State, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 257, 261 (1999) (noting the “idea 
that there is an entrenched American preference for certain kinds of plights over oth-
ers” (citations omitted)). 
219 Id. at 260; see also id. at 270 (“The need to fit new claims within a set of prece-
dents required successful appeals to describe events in a particular narrative form:  
sudden, unforeseeable events for which the petitioner was blameless . . . .”). 
220 Id. at 260.   
221 See Nir Eyal, Deep Exclusionary Reasons:  The Case of Luck Egalitarianism and 
Personal Responsibility for Health 11 (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/petrie-flom/workshop/eyal.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 
2011) (citing Paul Dolan & Aki Tsuchiya, The Social Welfare Function and Individual  
Responsibility:  Some Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 210 
(2009), and Erik Schokkaert & Kurt Devooght, Responsibility-Sensitive Fair Compensation 
in Different Cultures, 21 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 207 (2003)).   
222 See HOLMES, supra note 18, § 116.1 (stating that the “implied exception” insur-
ance doctrine withholds coverage where an insured intentionally causes or expects 
harm); Mariner, supra note 7, at 445 (explaining that the “known loss doctrine prec-
ludes coverage of a loss that has already occurred or that the policyholder reasonably 
expected to occur”). 
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found at fault in an accident.  Life insurance often carves out death by 
suicide for an initial period or charges someone in poor health higher 
premiums.223  Directors’ and officers’ insurance that indemnifies 
harms caused by a board member sometimes carves out harms result-
ing from willful or fraudulent acts or gross negligence.224
Likewise, health insurance could differentiate losses that an in-
sured should reasonably avoid (choice) from those the insured 
should, or could, not (chance).
 
225
Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn 
out—whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he 
or she should have anticipated and might have declined.  Brute luck is a 
matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles.
  The idea is that health insurance 
would isolate and redistribute the costs of misfortune, or what Ronald 
Dworkin calls “brute luck.”  He distinguishes “brute luck” from “op-
tion luck,” by explaining: 
226
For example, initial genetic makeup—including any flaws or 
gifts—is generally considered a result of an individual’s brute luck.  In 
contrast, winning the lottery, losing money on a failed business ven-
ture, or breaking a leg on a skydiving adventure gone awry are the re-
sult of option luck.  Abraham argued that someone agrees to risk of 
loss when choosing to engage in a high-risk activity.
 
227
Both egalitarian and efficiency arguments are made for prioritiz-
ing allocation of insurance dollars based upon avoidability of harm.  
 
 
223 See Gary Schuman, Suicide and the Life Insurance Contract:  Was the Insured Sane or 
Insane?  That is the Question—Or Is It?, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 745, 745-46 (1993) (noting 
that life and accident policies “almost always include a provision that if the insured 
commits suicide within a period of time specified in the policy, then the insurer shall 
not be obligated beyond returning the premiums paid” (footnote omitted)).  
224 See Michael Sean Quinn & Andrea D. Levin, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance:  
Probable Direction in Texas Law, 20 REV. LITIG. 381, 433-34 (2001) (discussing directors’ and 
officers’ insurance policy exclusions for “fraud, dishonesty, and deliberate criminality”).  
225 This standard implies that we expect insureds to understand certain risks and 
know that they should mitigate them.  This expectation may be too high for some 
health risks, in which case policies could be designed to cover such risks.     
226 RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 73 (2000).  But see Peter Vallentyne, 
Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities, 112 ETHICS 529, 532-38 
(2002) (arguing that brute luck might be easier to define in theory than in applica-
tion).  Avoidability is difficult to determine because it relies upon an account of what is 
reasonably avoidable, which could be difficult or meaningless to distinguish in close 
cases, and arbitrary if people are not fully informed, rational decisionmakers.  See id. at 
533 (noting, for example, that “[l]ying on the ground may sometimes be reasonable, 
but it is certainly unreasonable in many contexts”).  
227 See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 28-29 (noting the “effort to assure the affordability 
of insurance for socially unavoidable activities” as opposed to “optional pursuits”).  
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Some egalitarians argue for a model of distributive justice based on 
differential treatment of avoidable and unavoidable harms.  These 
luck-egalitarian philosophers have argued that inequities that result 
from brute luck should be neutralized to create greater equality. 228  
The idea is that it is unjust to ask the ill and injured to pay the costs of 
unavoidable conditions that impair their welfare.229
 
228 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 
  Consider a man 
with a congenital heart defect.  While imposing higher premiums or 
cost-sharing obligations on him better reflects the costs he is likely to 
impose on the insurance pool, a luck egalitarian would consider doing 
so morally unjust.  Insurance coverage that pays for care for the man’s 
heart defect can neutralize the random disadvantage he faces if he 
would otherwise pay for his own medical care or if his condition would 
go untreated.  To be clear, insurance coverage for his condition under 
226, at 73-74 (distinguishing between “deliberate 
gambles” and “brute bad luck”); Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for 
Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77, 85-87 (1989) (exploring the theory of “equal opportunity for 
welfare,” wherein differences in life outcomes are due not to social inequities but rather 
to individual decisionmaking); G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETH-
ICS 906, 916 (1989) (proposing an “equal access advantage” theory, wherein involuntary 
disadvantages—those beyond the actor’s control—merit compensation, while disadvan-
tages incurred voluntarily by the actor do not).  Other luck-egalitarian discussions offer 
amendments to this bright-line rule.  See generally SHLOMI SEGALL, HEALTH, LUCK, AND 
JUSTICE 45-110 (2010) (discussing various luck-egalitarian approaches and applications 
to health care concerns); Eyal, supra note 221, at 16 (“At some level we all grasp that, 
strictly in distributive justice terms, there is no objection to denying reckless risk takers 
related benefits, including medical benefits; but we also sense strong reasons . . . to be-
have, communicate and even believe that distributive justice opposes their abandon-
ment.”); Shlomi Segall, In Solidarity with the Imprudent:  A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism, 33 
SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 177, 198 (2007) (noting that “the principle of solidarity retains 
the distinction between the responsible and the irresponsible, allowing for (indepen-
dent) penalties for irresponsible, and unnecessarily risky, conduct”); Vallentyne, supra 
note 226, at 531, 537-38, 543-44 (arguing that brute luck is a difficult concept to define, 
that the line between brute and option luck is tenuous, and that in some cases, neutra-
lizing brute luck is inefficient and thus undesirable).   
 Daniel Markovits has suggested ways to amend this baseline rule.  See generally Daniel 
Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J. 2291, 2298-99 (2003) 
(contending that “responsibility-tracking” egalitarianism that attempts to distinguish 
brute and option luck is problematic); Daniel Markovits, Luck Egalitarianism and Political 
Solidarity, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 271, 275-76 (2007) (agreeing with criticisms of the 
“responsibility-tracking” strand of luck egalitarianism and supporting “more modest luck 
egalitarianism”).  But cf. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 
287, 288-89 (1999) (criticizing certain egalitarians for their preoccupation with brute 
luck concerns and arguing instead that the focus of egalitarianism should be eliminating 
societal oppression); Wikler, supra note 102, at 47 (arguing that “personal responsibility 
for health deserves but a peripheral role in health policy”).    
229 See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 29 (arguing that treating individuals as equals 
“requires that we all bear certain risks beyond some individuals’ control even though 
this risk sharing may increase the costs of some activities”). 
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a Brute Luck theory might not guarantee him equal results to those of 
someone born without such a condition; he may never be as healthy as 
someone born without the defect.  But to the extent possible through 
medical interventions (subject to allocation decisions discussed below), 
insurance spreads the costs of this man’s defect among those who en-
joyed the fortune of good health at birth. 
In addition to neutralizing random initial allocations of health, 
Brute Luck insurance would also indemnify unavoidable harms suf-
fered over an insured’s lifetime.230  Insurance might cover, for exam-
ple, medical care costs resulting from childhood leukemia, hereditary 
breast cancer, or injuries from a random, unpreventable accident to 
the extent that these harms are out of the insured’s control.  Con-
versely, insurance would not cover harms resulting from an insured’s 
own acts or choices, such as the costs of setting a broken leg from a 
rock climbing accident.  Likewise, while a less clear and perhaps more 
controversial policy, insurance might not cover costs of routine child-
birth to the extent that such costs are incurred as a result of a choice 
to procreate.231  In other words, maternity care services that health in-
surance coverage has commonly included and that some states have 
even mandated232
Others favor this model of insurance for its ability to preserve in-
centives for personal responsibility for healthy behaviors.  Brute Luck 
insurance creates incentives for individuals to avoid poor health where 
efficient and possible, while providing a cushion for losses that occur 
despite such preventive investments.  In doing so, this model—if well 
executed—facilitates efficiency in the insurance market.  According to 
Kenneth Abraham, drawing from Guido Calabresi’s Cost of Accidents, 
 might not be covered under Brute Luck insurance. 
 
230 Dworkin, for example, might support this sort of policy.  See DWORKIN, supra 
note 226, at 73-74 (“If someone develops cancer in the course of a normal life, and 
there is no particular decision to which we can point as a gamble risking the disease, 
then we will say that he has suffered brute bad luck.”).  But Vallentyne would support 
such equalization only if efficient.  See Vallentyne, supra note 226, at 543 (“[ J]ustice 
requires compensation for brute outcome luck when and only when doing so is a way 
of increasing the value of people’s initial opportunities.”). 
231 If not paying for such care would result in brute-luck harm to the newborn, in-
surance might still pay for the care to mitigate such harm or, if not, might at least pay 
for medical care for the infant. 
232 Eighteen states have mandated that insurers provide coverage for maternity 
care in some form.  See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Mandated Coverage of Ma-
ternity Care, January 2010, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/ 
comparetable.jsp?ind=687&cat=7 (tracking coverage of maternity care by state).  PPA-
CA includes maternity and newborn care as one of the enumerated categories of “es-
sential health benefits.”  PPACA § 1302, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
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“Insurance law promotes efficiency whenever it is structured to help 
reduce the sum of the costs of insurance and loss prevention.  The in-
tuitive idea behind this formula is that resources are allocated ineffi-
ciently whenever more could be saved through loss prevention than 
can be protected through insurance.”233  In the case of health insur-
ance, for example, if insurance were to fully compensate knee re-
placement surgery following destruction of the joint, an extreme-
sports enthusiast might have less motivation to consider moderation.  
However, if she knew (or should have known) that she would have to 
live to an old age with any joint damage she created in her youth, or 
pay for expensive surgery on her own, she might be more likely to en-
gage in physical therapy to stabilize and support her joints, to take nu-
tritional supplements for joint health, or to take a day or two off.234  In 
contrast, there would be no deterrence benefit to requiring the man 
who was born with a heart defect to pay for the significant medical 
care necessary over his lifetime.235  Charging him more for insurance 
to reflect his high expected costs does little to deter future medical 
care costs of this type, since initial bad luck made them necessary.236  
Such considerations have been taken up by “personal responsibility” 
advocates, who argue for insurance design that creates incentives for 
insureds to take responsibility for their own health with one end goal 
being a reduction in medical care spending.237
 
233 ABRAHAM, supra note 
  Thus, what I call the 
Brute Luck theory of health insurance captures both of these intui-
tions and stands for the idea that insurance should prioritize coverage 
of medical expenses for harms that the insured should not reasonably 
foresee and forestall.   
19, at 11 (footnote omitted); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE 
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:  A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26 (1970) (“Apart from the re-
quirements of justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is 
to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.”). 
234 This idea assumes that people are better informed about their health insurance 
coverage than they probably are, and it would therefore have to be accompanied with 
insurance-education campaigns to be effective.   
235 One might contend it is efficient, nonetheless, to require him to internalize the 
costs he will generate.   
236 There could also be a distinction based on the degree to which maternal beha-
vior caused the birth defect and whether imposing such costs could deter future harm 
to fetuses.  On the flip side, however, we could envision undesirable cost-avoidance im-
plications of the Brute Luck theory, such as selective abortion of fetuses with disabilities.   
237 See, e.g., REGINA E. HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE 245-52 (1997) (ad-
vocating for consumer-driven health care and arguing that such a change would cause 
health care costs to drop); Pauly, supra note 19, at 534 (noting that while individuals may 
recognize that excessive use of medical care contributes to higher total premiums, incen-
tive misalignment eliminates individuals’ incentives to curtail their own use).     
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But relying on a distinction between choice and chance to shape 
the design of health insurance is extremely complex, both normatively 
and operationally.  As is the case with the two prior models, propo-
nents of the Brute Luck model might disagree on the details of how to 
translate this concept into insurance design.  First, even some who 
support a Brute Luck approach would temper its application in some 
circumstances.238  In a recent article, Nir Eyal discusses the “harshness 
objection” that Elizabeth Anderson and others have raised to a theory 
of justice that requires denying medical care for certain avoidable 
harms.239  Eyal recounts the example of a reckless driver who hits a 
tree and will be seriously disabled unless “immediately evacuated to 
[a] hospital.”240  While the driver’s injuries result from his own reck-
less driving, many would have the intuition to rescue him nonethe-
less.241  Eyal examines exceptions that “luck-egalitarian pluralists” have 
proposed to the personal-responsibility rule to overcome this objec-
tion.242
 
238 See, e.g., Eyal, supra note 
  The theory of Brute Luck insurance, discussed herein, de-
viates somewhat from the reckless driver example because the theory 
concerns rationing of payment for care, not rationing of care itself.  
Even if ethical considerations demand saving the driver, perhaps in-
surance still should not cover his airlift and medical care costs—the 
costs of his reckless driving.  Arguably, he is less entitled to use dollars 
from a shared health insurance pool to pay for his care.  Some might 
still advance a harshness objection to limited funding for his care; 
others might not.  The relevant point for the present discussion is that 
even those who support personal responsibility as an allocation prin-
221 (exploring various accounts of pluralist luck egali-
tarianism in the health context and explaining why proponents of these theories might 
still “rescue” people who have caused their own poor health). 
239 See id. at 1-2.   
240 Id. at 1. 
241 Id. at 15.     
242 See id. at 2-14.  For example, personal responsibility might work better as one 
factor among many, as Shlomi Segall advocates.  See id. at 3-4 (arguing that the fulfill-
ment of people’s basic needs “overrides” distributive justice concerns within luck egali-
tarianism and therefore demands that the “prudent” and “imprudent” be treated 
equally (quoting SEGALL, supra note 228, at 76-77) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); see also Segall, supra note 228, at 194-98 (contending that people who could have 
avoided harms may still merit protection due to the “principle of solidarity” that re-
quires “collective responsibility” for “certain losses incurred by individual members”).  
Alternatively, avoidability might be useful if applied only as a second-order considera-
tion, after first-order considerations of, for example, enabling democratic participa-
tion.  See Eyal, supra note 221, at 6-8.  Eyal further considers additional exceptions in 
broadening the scope that all but swallow the personal responsibility rule.  Id. at 8-14. 
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ciple for funding medical care disagree on its applicability in cases 
where the result is arguably harsh. 
Second, advocates of this theory likely hold different conceptions of 
what is choice and what is chance and how to array harms on a scale 
from avoidable to random.  It is difficult to discern the degree of choice 
in a particular act.  To do so, it is necessary to determine if the insured 
had reason to know what would cause a harm (i.e., she knew how to 
prevent it), if she was in control of any triggers (i.e., she could have pre-
vented it), and if she opted to pull those triggers (i.e., she chose not to 
prevent it).  These determinations are especially complex with respect 
to medical harms.243  When dealing with illness or injury, it is often un-
clear what causes a particular illness or injury.  Medical causation is of-
ten difficult to prove, is underresearched, and is multifaceted.244
In addition, in many cases, it is debatable whether the root cause 
of a harm, once identifiable, is within an insured’s control (and to 
what degree) and whether she knew (or should have known) that she 
was assuming a risk she could prevent.  Some would argue that all ac-
tions reflect freely made choices; thus, we should look narrowly at in-
dividuals’ behavior to determine their choices.
 
245  This approach do-
minates much of neoclassical economics research, where individuals 
are considered—at the core—rational actors whose acts reflect their 
choices.  At the other extreme, others believe many choices are con-
strained by factors such as biology, psychology, or social environ-
ment.246
 
243 See Wikler, supra note 
  Consider, for example, a man who works on an oil rig because 
it is the only job he can get that enables him to make ends meet.  If he 
faces back strain and arthritis later in life because of the intense physical 
nature of his oil rig work, some would say these harms are the result of 
his free choice to take a taxing job for higher income, and others would 
102, at 49-52 (identifying numerous external factors, 
such as the influence of role models or poverty, that complicate the question of 
whether certain unhealthy behaviors are actually within an individual’s “control”).   
244 For articles discussing the complexity of medical causation, see, for example, 
D.I.W. Coggon & C.N. Martyn, Time and Chance:  The Stochastic Nature of Disease Causa-
tion, 365 LANCET 1434 (2005); A.J. McMichael, Commentary, Prisoners of the Proximate:  
Loosening the Constraints on Epidemiology in an Age of Change, 149 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
887 (1999). 
245 This is the approach used to define “preferences” in rational-choice theory.  See 
generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).  
246 See generally Frederick J. Zimmerman, Structure, Agency, and Institutions:  A 
Multi-Level Theory of the Determinants of Population Health (Dec. 22, 2010) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author) (criticizing simplistic accounting of prefe-
rences and proposing a more complex model for understanding human choices); see 
also supra note 102 (discussing social determinants of health).   
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say his choices were constrained by his lot in life.  Some examples are 
even murkier.  Studies by public health scholars have also suggested 
that certain unhealthy behaviors are due in part to genetics or socio-
economic status.247  For example, someone who has experienced low 
socioeconomic status in her lifetime is statistically more likely to smoke 
cigarettes and eat unhealthy foods.248  For some, obesity is a choice.  
However, studies of genetics and environment suggest that, for others, 
it may be more difficult or impossible to avoid obesity even if they de-
sire to be be otherwise.249
Translating this idea into practice, coverage would be more com-
prehensive for harms deemed the result of chance and less for those 
deemed the result of choice, and impliedly reasonably avoidable.  In-
surers could charge higher premiums to anyone who unreasonably as-
sumed health risks through their actions or inaction.  Cost-sharing ob-
ligations for medical care would vary based on the degree of the 
insured’s complicity in a medical harm.  Insurance policies could 
completely carve out coverage for negligently incurred health care 
costs, although doing so might be met with harshness objections.  For 
example, if someone suffers from a disease that was unavoidable, her 
cost-sharing obligations at the time of treatment would be little to 
none.  However, if she were genetically predisposed to back pain and 
  Thus, harms do not always fall clearly into 
categories of choice and chance, but rather array along some debatable 
spectrum of grays.  The translation of Brute Luck theory into insurance 
design differs depending on how lines are drawn between choice and 
chance.  What unites supporters of this approach, regardless of where 
they might draw lines, is the idea that lines should be drawn along the 
dichotomy of chance harms versus choice harms. 
 
247 See Pearce & Smith, supra note 102, at 125 (noting the idea that health is re-
lated to social factors because of “the influence of social cohesion on health-related 
behaviors”); see also S.A. Reijneveld, The Impact of Individual and Area Characteristics on 
Urban Socioeconomic Differences in Health and Smoking, 27 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 33, 35, 
38 (1998) (finding that poor health behaviors in impoverished areas are due over-
whelmingly to individuals’ low socioeconomic status).    
248 See J.W. Lynch et al., Why Do Poor People Behave Poorly?  Variation in Adult Health 
Behaviours and Psychosocial Characteristics by Stages of the Socioeconomic Lifecourse, 44 SOC. 
SCI. MED. 809, 809 (1997) (“The existence of socioeconomic inequalities in health has 
been well established.  Attempts to explain these inequalities have often made refer-
ence to the fact that behavioural factors, such as smoking, physical activity, and diet, 
are differentially distributed by socioeconomic levels.”).   
249 See, e.g., Claude Bouchard, Genetics of Obesity:  Overview and Research Directions 
(“The limited molecular marker studies published so far suggest that there will likely 
be several genes associated and/or linked with human obesity.”), in THE GENETICS OF 
OBESITY (Claude Bouchard ed., 1994).  For more information on this topic, see gener-
ally the collection of essays in THE GENETICS OF OBESITY, supra.  
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then also acted in a way likely to trigger onset of the pain (knowing 
that her actions might do so), she would incur cost-sharing obligations 
corresponding to her level of complicity in the onset of the pain.250  If, 
in contrast, she had no genetic predisposition to back pain and in-
duced it fully and knowingly through actions of her choice, she would 
be subject to high or total cost sharing.  If an insurance company were 
to gauge all nonrandom risk and incorporate it into pricing, the only 
risks that would remain for redistribution would be those that are un-
preventable or unforeseeable.251
Individual assumption of risk has, for some time, factored into 
private insurance design and actuarial risk-rating rules, especially in 
the individual market.
 
252  Actuarial risk rating reflects consideration of 
two types of risks, one type that is consistent with a Brute Luck ap-
proach and one that is not.  On the first, insurers have charged more 
for insurance if an applicant’s behaviors or lifestyle choices make her 
more likely—as determined by the insurance company—to incur high 
medical care costs.253  Insurers have long required people who partici-
pate in high-risk occupations or hobbies or who drink or smoke to pay 
higher insurance premiums or cost-sharing obligations.254
 
250 For a philosophical discussion of different ways one might determine how to 
attribute particular bad outcomes to individual action and to what degree, see general-
ly, for example, Arneson, supra note 
  Conversely, 
and also consistent with a Brute Luck understanding of insurance,  
antidiscrimination laws have prohibited premium variation based on 
certain factors that are more random, such as genetic makeup and 
228.   
251 See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 2 (“When such pricing is accurate, there is con-
siderable individual risk bearing, for then the insured pays a premium based on the 
predictable risk that he or she will suffer a loss.  The insurer simply pools the risk of 
unpredictable individual losses.”).   
252 See Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 
517, 534-35 (1983) (examining how an individual’s occupation and geographic loca-
tion are among factors that affect her “riskiness” grouping in insurance markets); 
Light, supra note 42, at 2503-04 (describing direct and indirect risk rating); see also Jo-
nathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771, 771-
73 (1988) (describing the ubiquity of actuarial techniques in modern day society and 
how they are used in industries, like the insurance market, to allocate risk).   
253 Many of the presumed risky factors that have been used over time do not statis-
tically predict high medical care costs; bias, more than evidence, might drive such fac-
tors.  See Robert Works, Whatever’s FAIR—Adequacy, Equity, and the Underwriting Preroga-
tive in Property Insurance Markets, 56 NEB. L. REV. 445, 471 (1977) (“Although the core 
concern of the underwriter is the human characteristics of the risk, cheap screening 
indicators are adopted as surrogates for solid information . . . . The invitations to un-
derwriters to introduce prejudgments and biases . . . are apparent.”), quoted in Austin, 
supra, note 252, at 534 n.92. 
254 Light, supra note 42, at 2503. 
HOFFMAN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  2:04 PM 
1932 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1873 
race.255
Other practices are less consistent with Brute Luck notions.  In-
surers in many states also consider preexisting conditions, which may 
or may not have been avoidable themselves, when setting insurance 
premium rates.  Insurers routinely deny coverage to any applicant 
considered high risk, regardless of the reason for the perceived risk 
and whether it was in the insured’s control or not.
  Prohibiting the use of such criteria, which might accurately 
predict individual risk, sacrifices a degree of actuarial accuracy and 
economic efficiency to avoid what have been deemed undesirable, 
discriminatory practices. 
256
In sum, in a Brute Luck insurance regime, rationing and pricing 
decisions would primarily turn upon difficult determinations of 
whether the cause of a harm was the result of choice or chance; this 
approach has been an influence on private markets for some time, de-
spite its complexity and controversial nature, and will continue in 
modified form under PPACA policies. 
 
2.  Brute Luck Policies of PPACA 
Even as the Brute Luck conception of health insurance is one that 
some adamantly defend as “real” insurance, its adoption as an organiz-
ing principle for health insurance faces periods of waxing and waning 
popularity.  A Brute Luck notion of insurance underlies several prom-
inent PPACA policies.  It is not, however, represented as strongly in 
PPACA’s policies as the first two theories of insurance.  This is perhaps 
unsurprising in light of PPACA’s goal of increasing insurance cover-
age.  The first two notions of insurance both feed this expansionary 
dynamic, by providing support for extending coverage to services that 
improve health or that protect wealth.  The Brute Luck theory, how-
 
255 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 
§ 101, 122 Stat 881, 883-88 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)) (ban-
ning the use of genetic information when setting insurance rates for group health plans). 
256 See, e.g., COLLINS ET AL, supra note 45, at 3-4 (noting the difficulty of finding af-
fordable coverage for those with preexisting conditions); Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et 
al., The Role of the Individual Health Insurance Market and Prospects for Change, HEALTH AFF., 
Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 79, 81 (2004) (describing insurance underwriting as a method of con-
trolling against adverse selection); MICHELLE M. DOTY ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH 
FUND, ISSUE BRIEF, PUB. NO. 1300, FAILURE TO PROTECT:  WHY THE INDIVIDUAL INSUR-
ANCE MARKET IS NOT A VIABLE OPTION FOR MOST U.S. FAMILIES 1-3 (2009), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2009/Jul/ 
Failure-to-Protect.aspx (noting the difficulty of finding affordable coverage in the indi-
vidual market); Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance 
Markets, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89, 97 (2001) (discussing methods by 
which insurers can distinguish high-risk individuals from low-risk individuals). 
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ever, could be seen to advocate contraction of coverage to a more li-
mited set of chance risks.  While it would not necessarily be inconsis-
tent to expand coverage to more people and simultaneously to limit 
the scope of that coverage, PPACA does not do so.  Over time, how-
ever, the expansionary nature of PPACA’s policies may prove too ex-
pensive to sustain.  Thus, Brute Luck principles might grow in impor-
tance if goals of cost control trump those of coverage expansion. 
Despite its less ubiquitous presence, Brute Luck theories of insur-
ance are represented in several important PPACA policies regarding 
pricing of insurance and scope of coverage.  PPACA changed the rules 
for premium pricing in several ways that could be understood accord-
ing to Brute Luck justifications.  First of all, the legislation prohibits 
insurers from issuing or pricing insurance based on factors that could 
result in charging those with bad brute luck higher premiums, limit-
ing consideration to factors that are arguably better—even if imper-
fect—proxies for isolating bad option luck.  For example, one of the 
most popular policies of PPACA is the prohibition of excluding cover-
age based on a preexisting condition and of the consideration of a 
preexisting condition in pricing insurance premiums.257
Post-PPACA, insurers may still differentially charge insureds based 
on several factors.  Now, though, premiums may vary based on only 
family size, age, geography, and tobacco-use status.
  As men-
tioned above, consideration of preexisting conditions in issuing, de-
signing, and pricing insurance has conflated illness and injury that 
were avoidable with illness and injury that were not, excluding indi-
viduals from coverage or charging them more regardless of the reason 
for a preexisting condition.  Although this PPACA policy is over-
inclusive from a Brute Luck perspective—carving out consideration of 
all conditions, even if the individual has contributed to their onset—
this policy ensures that private insurance will indemnify those who suf-
fer from unavoidable poor health, in line with luck-egalitarian visions 
of justice.  The following two policies counterbalance this overinclu-
siveness by sanctioning alternate, more precise ways for insurers to 
identify and charge more for assumed risk. 
258
 
257 See PPACA sec. 1201, § 2704, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-3 (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
  Two of these 
factors—tobacco-use status and geography—could both be seen as 
proxies for the fact that an insured has assumed higher medical care 
costs than her otherwise similarly situated peers, depending on the 
degree of choice attributed to decisions about whether to smoke and 
258 Id., § 2701(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1)(A). 
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where to live.  PPACA authorizes insurers to charge smokers pre-
miums 1.5 times greater than those for nonsmokers.259  Studies show 
that smokers’ medical care costs are as much as 40% higher than non-
smokers’ expenses.260  Charging smokers more for premiums can be 
seen as a tax on risk assumption, creating incentives to quit (i.e., risk 
avoidance) by charging more for a high-risk behavior.261  A Brute Luck 
theory could also justify geography-based premium adjustments—
although perhaps choice is less evident in this instance.  Per-person 
medical care expenses in the United States, adjusted for the health, 
age, sex, and race of the population, vary geographically by more than 
a factor of almost three to one from high-cost to low-cost medical re-
gions.262  Sometimes, high- and low-cost medical care regions are quite 
similar in many regards.263  To the extent someone assumes the risk of 
high medical care costs by choosing to live and receive care in a high-
cost area, presuming she could choose otherwise, a Brute Luck policy 
to charge more for coverage would serve to deter avoidable use of 
health care in high-cost areas.264
Perhaps more monumentally, the legislation expands the scope of 
discounts that employers and insurers can offer subscribers for partic-
ipation in wellness programs where they can, presumably, reduce the 
 
 
259 Id. § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
260 See Jan J. Barendregt et al., The Health Care Costs of Smoking, 337 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1052, 1053 (1997) (“The difference varies with the age group, but among 65-to-
74-year-olds the costs for smokers are as much as 40 percent higher among men and as 
much as 25 percent higher among women.”). 
261 This policy, of course, presumes that smoking is a choice.  To the degree to-
bacco smoking is much more likely for someone who is born into a poor, inner-city 
household or who has a genetic predisposition for addiction, smoking could be a re-
sult of brute-luck factors as well as choice.  See supra note 248 and accompanying text.   
262 See Elliott S. Fisher et al., Slowing the Growth of Health Care Costs—Lessons from Re-
gional Variation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 849, 850 fig. (2009) (illustrating graphically that 
per capita 2006 Medicare expenditures in Miami, Florida were approximately $16,000 
compared to approximately $6000 in Salem, Oregon). 
263 See Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 36, 36-37 
(comparing health care expenditures in McAllen and El Paso, two similar Texas com-
munities with a wide gap in dollars spent per Medicare enrollee). 
264 Again, to the extent people are not aware (and, as a policy matter, should not 
become aware) that they are moving to a high-cost health region, charging them more 
for insurance based on geography might not make Brute Luck sense.  Likewise, if a 
decision to move to such a region is not reasonably avoidable, such a policy would be 
undesirable.  If, for example, lower income workers live in expensive health care re-
gions because those areas are also areas with greater employment opportunities, the 
decision on where to live may be constrained.  In such a situation, higher pricing does 
not serve Brute Luck deterrence and justice aims, even if it causes insureds to internal-
ize the higher costs of care in those regions.  
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risk of their future medical care costs.265  A wellness program is de-
fined as a program that is “designed to promote health or prevent dis-
ease.”266  These programs have historically been allowed as part of 
group health plans, but they have been heavily regulated to avoid con-
flict with the nondiscrimination rules under HIPAA.267  PPACA incor-
porates and expands the two types of wellness programs permitted 
under HIPAA for group markets and creates a ten-state demonstration 
project for creation of such programs in the individual market.268  The 
first type of wellness program provides benefits simply for participa-
tion, such as subsidized gym memberships or reduced copayments for 
participation in smoking-cessation programs, regardless of the out-
comes resulting from participation.269  The second type of program 
provides benefits for attainment of goals and must meet the following 
conditions:  (1) the reward is not over thirty percent of the cost of 
coverage under the plan; (2) the program is not “a subterfuge for dis-
criminating based on a health status factor”; (3) there is annual op-
portunity for participation; and (4) the reward is available “to all simi-
larly situated individuals,” which includes providing an alternative 
standard if it is “unreasonably difficult” or unadvisable for an insured, 
because of a medical condition, to satisfy the standard.270
Although some argue that wellness discounts are tantamount to al-
lowing price discrimination on the basis of individual health status, if 
they are well-targeted, these discounts are a more nuanced approach 
than prior crude risk-rating methods, and they will result in higher 
charges for assumed risk of poor health, rather than simply for the exis-
 
 
265 Such programs represent an area of overlap between goals of the Health Pro-
motion and Brute Luck theories.  They hold the potential both to improve health and 
to create incentives for individuals to prevent health risks responsibly.   
266 PPACA § 1201, § 2705( j)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4( j)(1)(A) (West Supp. 
1A 2010).  
267 See Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and Lifestyle 
Discrimination—The Legal Limits, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 193 (2008)(noting that  
HIPAA makes it more difficult for plans to reward attainment of goals than to reward 
participation); cf. Robert Steinbrook, Imposing Personal Responsibility for Health, 355 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 753, 754-56 (2006) (describing West Virginia’s Medicaid experiment with 
a program similar to a wellness program).  For more information on the nondiscrimi-
nation requirements, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.      
268 PPACA sec. 1201, § 2705(l), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4(l). 
269 See id., § 2705( j)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4( j)(1) (distinguishing between well-
ness programs that are and are not “based on an individual’s satisfying a standard that 
is related to a health status factor”).   
270 Id., § 2705(j)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4( j)(3). 
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tence of poor health.271  Wellness programs, while arguably imperfect, 
better isolate and provide discounts to people who actively minimize 
their future potential losses and charge more to those who do not, to 
the degree that participation in such programs does indeed reduce 
health risks.  In theory, such a program could serve both deterrence 
and luck-egalitarian aims.  The programs create incentives for insureds 
to improve their health, to the extent it is medically possible and advis-
able, and then they charge more to those who do not engage in such 
risk avoidance.272
Of course, the nuances of program design can either foster or 
undercut the ability of the programs to serve these aims.  For exam-
ple, PPACA provides an alternate standard for those who cannot par-
ticipate for medical reasons—a standard which might be overly broad 
from a Brute Luck perspective if the medical condition posing the 
impediment to participation was self-induced.
   
273  Further, PPACA does 
not consider other impediments to participation, such as lack of 
access to physicians and fitness centers, which may themselves result 
from factors that could be considered bad brute luck.274
 
271 Critics argue that offering participants discounted premiums for goal attain-
ment is an unfair means of cost-shifting to other, presumably less healthy, individuals 
in the pool who do not attain the wellness-program goals.  See generally Harald Schmidt 
et al., Carrots, Sticks, and Health Care Reform—Problems with Wellness Incentives, 362 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. e3 (2009), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp0911552 (dis-
cussing concerns related to these incentives that “[i]n some cases . . . are really sticks 
dressed up as carrots”).  For example, if one member receives a premium discount for 
attainment of lowered cholesterol levels, the insurer must recoup the premium dollars 
lost in this discount, presuming the member does not offset the discount with reduced 
medical expenses.  One way to “recoup” these dollars is to shift the costs to those who 
do not participate in wellness programs or fail to achieve goals.  The programs could 
be seen as a back-door way to continue to charge people based upon their relative 
health status if poor health status prevents achievement of goals.   See id. at e3(2)-(3). 
  Regardless of 
272 These programs may not reduce the total losses in a risk pool.  As noted above, 
prevention of disease might merely serve to delay, not eliminate, major health ex-
penses.  See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
273 Extreme obesity, which may thwart participation, could result from choice or 
genetics.  In defining whether obesity is a disability, some courts have tried to differen-
tiate between “physiologically” caused obesity and, presumably, behavioral obesity, but 
drawing such lines is difficult at best.  For discussion of the treatment of obesity in state 
and federal antidiscrimination law, see Mello & Rosenthal, supra note 267, at 195-96.  
Mello and Rosenthal also discuss the case, EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 
436, 443 (6th Cir. 2006), that made the “physiological” distinction.  Mello & Rosenthal, 
supra note 267, at 196.    
274 If some people are unable or less likely to participate in these programs be-
cause of factors beyond their control, the programs harm those whose participation is 
thwarted by factors some would consider brute bad luck.  For example, in German 
wellness programs, nonparticipants tend to be lower-income insureds, whom evidence 
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the soundness of the particular policy design, the underlying goal is to 
provide discounts for those who engage in programs that reduce 
health risks, consistent with Brute Luck notions. 
Finally, the Brute Luck theory emerges in more subtle ways as well.  
For example, the above-mentioned premium assistance for those earn-
ing between 100% and 400% of the FPL provides less financial protec-
tion for tobacco smokers, presumably not subsidizing the increased 
medical costs of smoking.275  As discussed above, subsidies are based on 
the amount by which the silver level plan premium exceeds an individ-
ual’s required contribution to premiums, based upon income level.276  
The silver level plan premium used for subsidy calculations is adjusted 
based on what an insurer will charge someone of the insured’s age in 
the insured’s geography, but the amount is not adjusted for increased 
premiums because of the insured’s tobacco use or participation in a 
wellness program.277
To make this example concrete, as Table 1 below illustrates, if an 
individual earns $27,075 a year, or 250% of the FPL,
  This means that the actual premium a smoker 
pays might be higher than the premium used for the subsidy calcula-
tion, which implies that her contribution toward premiums could be 
considerably more than a similarly situated nonsmoker. 
278 PPACA requires 
she pay 8.05% of her income toward premium costs ($2180 per year).279
 
has shown to be less able and less likely to participate because they have neither the 
time nor the access to physicians and facilities necessary.  Participation rates among 
people in the top socioeconomic quintile are nearly twice those in the lowest.  Schmidt 
et al., supra note 
  
Imagine the second lowest cost individual silver level plan in her state 
for someone her age costs $5000 per year.  If she smokes, an insurer 
can charge her 1.5 times the standard premium, or $7500 per year for 
271, at e3(2).  To the degree someone deems poverty a misfortune, 
rather than a choice, charging the poor more for insurance for failure to participate 
would be inconsistent with Brute Luck aims.     
275 See PPACA sec. 1201, § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iv) 
(providing that premiums can be increased 1.5 times for tobacco use); id. § 1401(a), 
26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(3)(C) (defining, for purposes of calculating subsidies, “adjusted 
monthly premium” as that “which would have been charged . . . for the plan if each 
individual . . . were covered by such silver plan and the premium was adjusted only for 
the age of each such individual in the manner allowed under section 2701 of the Pub-
lic Health Service Act”).  The result of these two provisions is that insurers can increase 
premiums for tobacco use, but premium subsidies will not cover such increases. 
276 See supra subsection II.B.2. 
277 See PPACA § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(3)(C).   
278 $27,075 is based on the 2010 federal poverty level guide.  See 2010 HHS POVERTY 
GUIDELINES, supra note 166, at 45,629 (identifying $10,830 as 100% of the poverty level 
for an individual).  The numbers used in the example above are rounded for simplicity. 
279 HCERA sec. 1001(a)(1), § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i). 
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this plan.280
On the flip side, if this same smoker received a 30% discount on 
her premiums for participation in a wellness program for smoking 
cessation, her actual premium would be $5250 (a 30% discount off of 
the $7500 smoker’s premium).
  Even though the insurer can charge her up to $7500, her 
premium subsidy is calculated based on the excess of the standard 
$5000 premium over her expected contribution of $2180.  She will re-
ceive a subsidy of $2820.  If, however, her policy costs $7500, her actual 
contribution could be as high as $4680 (over 17% of her income), as 
compared to $2180 (8% of income) for a similarly situated nonsmoker.  
From a Brute Luck perspective, this additional contribution could be 
considered her “smoker’s tax” for taking on avoidable risks. 
281
 
  In this case, her engagement in a 
program aimed at risk avoidance would lower her out-of-pocket expo-
sure to $2430 after the subsidy, still more than the nonsmoker’s $2180 
contribution but less than if she did nothing to improve her health.  
Plus, if she successfully quits smoking through the program, she will 
benefit from the nonsmoker premium in future years. 
Table 1:  Comparison of Subsidized Insurance Costs for  
Smokers and Nonsmokers 
 
 Premium 
Charged 
Subsidy 
Amount 
Out-of-Pocket 
Costs 
(% of income) 
“Smoker’s 
tax” 
Nonsmoker $5000 $2820 $2180 
(8.05%) 
N/A 
Smoker $7500 $2820 $4680 
(17%) 
$2500 
Smoker in 
Wellness  
Program 
$5250 $2820 $2430 
(9%) 
$250 
 
Thus, as intended, this Brute Luck policy provides rewards for 
those who avoid harms, but to the degree that someone knowingly as-
sumes risk of harms, she is vulnerable to the costs of the risks she as-
sumes.  In the next Section, I will explore how this Brute Luck policy 
conflicts with both Health Promotion and Financial Security aims. 
 
280 See PPACA sec. 1201, § 2701(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg (amending the Public 
Health Service Act provisions prohibiting discriminatory premium rates). 
281 See id., § 2705(j)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4( j)(3)(A) (providing for a maxi-
mum discount of thirty percent). 
HOFFMAN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  2:04 PM 
2011] Three Models of Health Insurance 1939 
D.  Conflicts and Policy Discordance 
Is it possible to imagine a system that promotes health, in which 
people contribute to the extent that such contributions do not pose 
financial risk, and which insures primarily (or only) chance harms?  
The three notions clearly overlap to some degree, and there are poli-
cies, residing in the areas of full overlap, where the principles and 
goals of all three are harmonious. 
 
Figure 2:  The Uncertain Zones of Overlap 
 
 
A policy requiring coverage of the costs of managing an unavoid-
able chronic disease, such as childhood diabetes for example, might 
be consistent with all three theories.  Controlling the diabetes, which 
is likely the result of random bad luck, could greatly improve and pro-
long the child’s life and will be very expensive, thus likely to create 
unmanageable financial risk for most families if not covered by insur-
ance.  The PPACA policy regarding preexisting conditions can like-
wise serve policy goals of all three conceptions of health insurance.  
To the extent prior exclusion of a preexisting condition from cover-
age prevented use of high-value, expensive care for an unavoidable 
disease, prohibiting such exclusions accords with goals of all three 
theories of health insurance. 
It is possible to choose and craft policies to lie in these areas of 
overlap, but it is unrealistic to think that reconciliation of the three by 
way of operating completely in the space of overlap is possible or even 
desirable.  As a threshold matter, even if possible, the space of overlap 
may not be the ideal space in which to create policy.  Compromise 
policies may not optimize the goals of any of the three approaches if 
policies central to each theory fall outside of the area of overlap and 
only penumbral policies fall inside the zone of overlap. 
Some Overlap More Overlap Less Overlap 
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In addition, whether because of normative conflict among the 
three conceptions or because of budgetary limitations, tensions or 
discordance among policies that further the goals of each conception 
are unavoidable.  Two types of discordance are bound to arise.  The 
first is what could be thought of as principled conflict, where the 
ideals of two of the theories are incompatible.  Strong versions of each 
theory would demand that dollars should be spent only if compatible 
with the core goals of that theory.  In this case, discordance arises any 
time a policy is not consistent with the goals of all three theories.  The 
second is conflict in light of scarcity of funds.  This weaker interpreta-
tion of each theory would say that each theory guides spending priori-
ties but would not absolutely bar spending on other goals.  This inter-
pretation lessens discordance but would still lead to conflicts in 
application because each model would prioritize the use of limited 
budget dollars differently. 
To illustrate, while the Health Promotion and Financial Security 
notions of insurance both justify covering many health services that re-
spond to injuries or illness resulting from brute bad luck, they also both 
support coverage of losses that result from choice.  Health Promotion 
theory justifies insurance coverage of smoking-cessation programs, re-
gardless of whether the smoker chose to smoke in the first place, so 
long as such programs offer a high-value way to improve health.  Like-
wise, a Financial Security model of insurance would cover lung cancer 
treatment to the extent that such treatment threatens financial sol-
vency, even for someone whose own smoking was the primary cause of 
the lung cancer.  The strong version of a Brute Luck approach would 
resist covering such harms in any circumstance, while a weaker version 
would deprioritize such coverage when funding is limited but would not 
bar coverage completely, particularly in a world of plenty. 
Discordance is more frequent under the strong versions of the 
theories, but it will arise even under the weaker versions as PPACA is 
implemented.  If budgets were flush, there would be less struggle over 
how to spend limited dollars.  In the real world, however, there will be 
conflict, and regulators will be called on to resolve this conflict.  The 
following subsections illustrate how the PPACA policies discussed in 
Part II create discordance among the ideals of the three conceptions 
of insurance.  Part III then teases out ways regulators will have to ad-
dress these explicit tensions as well as manage less obvious tensions 
that will also arise as the law is implemented. 
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1.  Discordance Arising from Health Promotion Policies  
The PPACA requirement that all insurance policies include first-
dollar coverage of preventive care282 is based on Health Promotion 
ideals and is largely inconsistent with the goals of the two other visions 
of insurance.  From a Health Promotion perspective, concerns that 
people are not engaging in valuable preventive care—to their own po-
tential health detriment—outweigh concerns of moral hazard. First-
dollar coverage of preventive care (as well as the creation of federally 
mandated EHBs) increases the use of medical services to achieve bet-
ter health outcomes.  This increased use will almost certainly, at least 
in the short run, increase medical care spending.283
From a Brute Luck perspective, such a policy collectivizes costs that 
rational, responsible individuals should bear on their own.  A strong 
version of Brute Luck insurance would not cover preventive care in 
most cases; a weaker version would make it lower-priority spending.  In-
stead, Brute Luck insurance would be designed to create incentives for 
people to seek out prevention on their own to the extent they can rea-
sonably do so.
 
284
A strong version of a Financial Security theory would not support 
insurance coverage of preventive care for those who could afford it 
unless the particular services covered were proven to be cost-saving; 
  Toward such ends, not only would Brute Luck insur-
ance plans not cover prevention, but they also would not cover the costs 
of downstream services an individual might need if she unreasonably 
failed to invest in preventive care.  Excluding coverage of such down-
stream harms is intended to create an incentive for an insured to invest 
responsibly in preventive services and to stave off expensive, avoidable 
harms.  For example, although harsh, health insurance might deny a 
woman dialysis if she behaved in a way that stressed her kidneys in the 
first place, leading to kidney failure. 
285
 
282 PPACA sec. 1001, § 2713, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13. 
 
a weaker version would deprioritize such spending.  Such first-dollar 
coverage uses insurance resources to buy out the base of people who 
283 As mentioned in note 80 supra, studies disagree on whether preventive care will 
result in significant cost savings, even if the care is high-value in terms of health out-
comes per dollar spent.  Studies suggest that buying out the base (or paying for pre-
ventive services that people are currently using) is likely to have a net cost.  See RUS-
SELL, PREVENTION’S POTENTIAL, supra note 80, at 8.   
284 It might still cover such care for people who cannot afford it for reasons out-
side of their reasonable control. 
285 See infra Section III.A for a discussion of prevention and the low likelihood of 
cost savings.   
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would have obtained preventive care, even if they had to pay out of 
pocket.286
2.  Discordance Arising from Financial Security Policies  
  Including all costs of preventive care under the umbrella of 
insurance intentionally and paternalistically funds prevention through 
insurance even for those who could afford it and did pay for it before 
reform.  Requiring insurance coverage of these services redistributes 
their costs broadly among all insureds, including the lower-income in-
sureds, who could, in turn, be subject to higher premiums.  Unless 
these increased costs are counterbalanced by additional premium sub-
sidies, these Health Promotion policies threaten to increase financial 
insecurity for some insureds. 
Policies motivated by Financial Security goals could likewise create 
conflict.  For example, the prohibition of annual and lifetime limits 
could, in practice, undermine Health Promotion and Brute Luck goals.  
The unfortunate truth is that spending over an annual limit will result 
in some spending with low health value.287
A second example, while less likely, is that if employers do in fact 
self-insure to avoid coverage of EHBs in light of the restrictions on 
  To the extent that such 
spending is for end-of-life care, incurable and terminal disease, or ex-
pensive interventions with a low probability of success, using resources 
to pay for such care is low priority under a Health Promotion model.  
Further, harms that lead to extremely high medical expenses may result 
from what are typically considered unavoidable causes (e.g., hemophilia 
or Alzheimer’s disease) or from arguably avoidable causes (e.g., liver 
transplantation due to alcoholism, extensive harms from a reckless driv-
ing accident, or costs associated with a multiple-gestation pregnancy 
from infertility treatment).  Although it is naïve to believe that prohibit-
ing insurance policy limits greatly increases self-harming behavior by 
indemnifying the costs of resultant harm, it might decrease incentives at 
the margin for insured individuals to avoid certain extreme medical 
harms or expenses.  At the very least, the policy authorizes significant 
medical spending on harms that have arguably lower health value and 
to which insureds may have contributed. 
 
286 Jonathan Gruber describes this problem by analogizing policymaking to tuna 
fishing and advocates designing policies that use public funds to expand coverage in a 
way that catches the uninsured “tuna” without also catching the already-insured “dol-
phins” in the net of publicly financed care (i.e., avoiding overinclusiveness).  Gruber, 
supra note 7, at 585-86. 
287 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing flat-of-the-curve 
spending). 
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policy limits on such benefits, the Financial Security prohibition on 
policy limits could undermine coverage of “essential” Health Promo-
tion services.  For example, if HIV care is included as an EHB and 
employers deem it too expensive to cover unlimited HIV-care ex-
penses, they could self-insure to create a benefits structure that does 
not cover HIV care at all.288  Such exclusions would threaten health 
and possibly also the financial security of those in need of HIV care.289
3.  Discordance Arising from Brute Luck Policies  
 
As alluded to above, the Brute Luck policy that does not allow for 
greater premium subsidies for smokers—even though they may be 
charged higher insurance premiums than similarly situated nonsmok-
ers—is in tension with both Health Promotion and Financial Security 
goals.  As discussed in Section II.C, premium subsidies are based on a 
standard rate, even though a tobacco user might in reality pay 1.5 
times this rate290
Application of this policy undermines goals of both the Financial 
Security and Health Promotion models.  The cost of premiums alone 
could cause financial strain for the low-income smoker.  Furthermore, if 
the smoker exhausts her income on premiums, she might be unable to 
afford the out-of-pocket costs necessary to consume medical care servic-
es.  Alternatively, if premiums at 17% of income are unaffordable and 
she opts for a less expensive plan, her coverage will be less comprehen-
sive and will have higher cost-sharing obligations, again resulting in 
greater potential financial exposure and less ability to access medical 
care due to high cost-sharing.  Finally, she might decide not to purchase 
health insurance at all, especially because her higher smoker’s pre-
mium would exempt her from the individual mandate to carry insur-
ance on “affordability” grounds.
 and expose the hypothetical low-income smoker to 
premium costs that could cost upwards of 17% of her income, as 
compared to 8% if she were a nonsmoker. 
291
 
288 This example is based on a legal challenge to an instance in which an employer 
dropped coverage for HIV care in response to an employee’s expensive claims for ser-
vices.  See McGann v. H&H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403, 408 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that this change in coverage did not violate ERISA because it was not motivated by re-
taliation against the employee).  
  Thus, the Brute Luck exclusion of 
289 This policy could also be seen simply as ineloquent, creating unintended con-
sequences rather than conflict. 
290 See PPACA sec. 1201, § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iv) 
(West Supp. 1A 2010). 
291 She would be exempted from the mandate under the affordability exemption 
that applies to those for whom coverage is over eight percent of income, assuming the 
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tobacco status in the calculation of subsidies could leave her vulnerable 
to health and financial risks of being uninsured.292
III.  MANAGING CONCEPTUAL PLURALISM AND THE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF PPACA 
  These are examples 
of conflicts that arise from policies that clearly reflect values of one of 
the three different conceptions of insurance.  Regulators will be called 
on to mediate these conflicts, as well as further conflicts that will be-
come evident only as policies are implemented. 
This final Part anticipates various ways that these multiple—
sometimes conflicting—conceptions of health insurance make im-
plementation of the law complex.  It is difficult to know exactly where 
the policy discordance, described in Section II.D, will be the most 
contentious.  It is also impossible to predict the many ways in which 
these different notions of insurance will influence interpretations of 
policies that, while neutral on their face, will come to reflect a particu-
lar conception of insurance in practice. 
What is evident is that regulators will have to balance these three 
conceptions of insurance often.  Regulators have no roadmap for how 
to prioritize or optimize these pluralistic conceptions of insurance 
when interpreting the law; at times, they may not even be aware that 
in simply making decisions informed by their own preconceptions 
about what health insurance should do, they are making choices that 
prioritize one conception over the others. 
It is also evident that these interpretations will have a dramatic in-
fluence on the final shape of reform.  The legislation leaves many im-
portant resource-allocation decisions to regulation.  And the regulatory 
process has been, and will continue to be, closely scrutinized and widely 
publicized as it plays out on a symbolic political battleground.293
 
cost of the least expensive plan is not so low as to bring her costs down to eight percent 
of income, after the subsidy.  See id. § 1501, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(1)(A).   
  The 
examples below illustrate that, over the coming years, state and federal 
regulators and implementers will frequently need to define which con-
ception of insurance PPACA will advance.  They will do so when they 
define policies that are written with a particular conception of insur-
292 Perhaps this vulnerability is the beginning of a success story for Brute Luck de-
terrence.  If the smoker quits, her health presumably improves, her premiums de-
crease, and the three theories’ goals dovetail nicely.  However, to the extent not all in-
sured individuals yield to such incentives, policy discordance remains.   
293 See Lichtblau & Pear, supra note 28 (highlighting political and policy conflicts 
arising as regulators fill in the gaps of PPACA). 
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ance in mind, as in the case of EHBs below, as well as when interpreting 
policies that are neutral on their face but could be translated to favor a 
particular conception of insurance.  They will also do so when evaluat-
ing the success of a PPACA policy to the extent that the yardstick used 
measures success in light of normative interests of a particular concep-
tion of insurance.  Finally, they will do so when determining whether to 
allocate resources to a policy that furthers one conception of insurance.  
In all of these situations, a clearer understanding of how the law could 
be shaped to accommodate different conceptions of health insurance 
could enable regulators to make more thoughtful and intentional deci-
sions about how it should be shaped. 
A.  Challenges of Interpretation 
Ideas about what insurance should do will affect the interpretation 
of many provisions of the law.  Even policies that appear crafted with a 
particular vision of insurance in mind could just as easily be interpreted 
through the lens of another vision.  Consider the above example of de-
veloping and defining which services insurers must cover as EHBs.  The 
Washington Post recently reported that an independent advisory board 
has begun “what is likely to be a long and emotional process” to define 
EHBs.294  As discussed in Section II.A, the text of PPACA implies an ex-
pectation that covering EHBs will yield health benefits in a broad-based 
way and urges the Secretary to define services with Health Promotion 
values in mind.295
With recognition of such tensions, regulators could interpret 
EHBs to either ground this policy solidly in Health Promotion ideals 
or instead redirect it to some degree toward Financial Security or 
Brute Luck goals.  Take the example of “[m]aternity and newborn 
care,” an EHB category.
  Yet, as discussed in Section II.D, a broad interpreta-
tion of EHBs grounded in Health Promotion ideals can undermine 
goals of both of the other models of health insurance by driving up 
costs and covering services contrary to their core goals. 
296
 
294 N.C. Aizenman, “Basic” Gets Tricky in the Health-Care Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 
2011, at A2.  
  If interpreted through a Health Promotion 
lens, any service that cost-effectively promotes the health of a mother 
or newborn would be included.  The Secretary could broadly define 
mandated coverage to include a full range of maternal and child 
health services and cause the distribution of the costs of such services 
295 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.   
296 PPACA § 1302(b)(1)(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1B 2010).  
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broadly among insureds.  This means that even those mothers who 
could easily afford the costs of maternity care and who are pregnant 
by choice will have insurance compensate their maternity care. 
In contrast, under a Financial Security approach, the Secretary of 
HHS would require mandatory coverage of only those services likely 
to result in unmanageable medical expenses, such as expensive inter-
ventions necessary due to complications.  Routine costs of childbear-
ing might be regarded as unlikely to cause people financial insecurity, 
particularly if they could borrow to finance such costs over a number 
of years, and thus might not be included as EHBs.  Fewer maternity-
related costs would thus be broadly distributed among insureds, and 
the costs that would be collectivized would be those most likely to 
cause financial insecurity for individuals if not collectivized. 
If taking a Brute Luck perspective, the Secretary could choose to 
mandate coverage of only those costs that an insured could not have 
avoided, which, depending on how they are interpreted, might in-
clude very few of the costs for a noncoerced, routine pregnancy.  
Pregnancy is typically not the result of poor brute luck; for the fortu-
nate, it is exactly the opposite.  However, because demand for mater-
nal care results from, in most cases, a conscious decision to engage in 
sexual intercourse, which logically might result in pregnancy, its re-
lated costs might not be covered under Brute Luck insurance.297  Al-
though this final “tough love” interpretation places a significant bur-
den on individuals and is questionable public policy for other 
reasons,298
 
297 Of course, there are a range of situations in which pregnancy or other health 
issues result from forced or coerced intercourse, or where reasonable efforts made to 
prevent the pregnancy were unsuccessful (e.g., failure of birth control).  In such situa-
tions, pregnancy might be treated as a brute luck event. 
 it offers a valid way to interpret the maternity-care EHB.  
Because the meaning of this policy could have such dramatically dif-
ferent outcomes depending on its interpretation, it is not surprising 
that reports indicate that the early discussions regarding such deci-
sions are highly charged.  Although wrestling with the three concep-
tions of insurance explicitly will not necessarily make it any easier to 
draw regulatory lines, informed regulators will be more aware of the 
298 From a deterrence standpoint, not covering childbirth might serve to discourage 
people from having more children than they can afford or require that people save for 
the costs of children they do have—a policy some might consider reasonable.  However, 
this policy also discriminates against the poor and violates some egalitarian sensibilities.  
In addition, even if the pregnancy is a choice, failure to cover prenatal care might harm 
the infant, triggering a chain reaction of future brute luck medical harms.   
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implications of different definitions and the normative tradeoffs at 
stake in choosing a particular one. 
B.  Challenges of Evaluation 
As when they are charged with interpreting a given policy, when 
regulators are asked to evaluate the success or effectiveness of a policy, 
they are inherently relying upon a particular conception of the goals 
of insurance to define success or effectiveness.  Consider the imple-
mentation of the wellness programs discussed above in Section II.C.  
PPACA limits wellness-program discounts (for those wellness pro-
grams where the reward is “based on an individual’s satisfying a stan-
dard that is related to a health status factor”) to thirty percent of the 
cost of coverage,299 but it allows for these discounts to grow over time.  
It provides that “[t]he Secretaries of Labor, Health and Human Ser-
vices, and the Treasury may increase the reward available . . . to up to 
50 percent of the cost of coverage if the Secretaries determine that 
such an increase is appropriate.”300
But what determines the definition of appropriate?  The answer 
will depend on what conception of insurance a regulator has in mind 
when making such a judgment.  If appropriate is judged through a 
Brute Luck view of insurance, it would be sufficient that wellness pro-
grams are promoting efficient risk avoidance.  From a Health Promo-
tion perspective, an increase in the available discount might be rea-
sonable if it will further improve health; yet, under a strong version of 
the theory, it would not be enough that people are lowering risks of 
harms (and thus improving their health) if the dollars for additional 
discounts would offer greater health value if spent in other ways in-
stead.  From a Financial Security perspective, these programs are most 
valuable when they result in health improvements where the dollars 
saved in future medical care costs outpace the discounts paid out.  
This result would occur if an individual is spared future unmanagea-
ble costs or if, at the system level, premium costs could be reduced 
across the board.  However, as the above discussion of cost savings 
from prevention suggested, it is unlikely that either of these cost-
  PPACA requires these three agen-
cies, acting together, to determine when an increase is “appropriate” 
and thus when to allow wellness programs to become a more promi-
nent feature of insurance plans. 
 
299 PPACA sec. 1201, § 2705( j)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4( j)(3)(A)(West Supp. 
1A 2010). 
300 Id.  
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savings benefits will be realized.  Thus, from a Financial Security pers-
pective, it would not be particularly valuable to spend additional dol-
lars on discounts, even if the programs resulted in improved health. 
Another, perhaps less obvious instance in which these three con-
ceptions will inform the definition of success of a policy is the review 
of premium increases.  PPACA directs the Secretary of HHS, in con-
junction with the states, to develop a process for annual review of 
premium-rate increases to determine when such increases are “unrea-
sonable.”301  However, PPACA does not define unreasonable, nor does 
it provide any process for determining reasonableness.  The proposed 
regulations are not much more concrete.  They indicate that the Sec-
retary will adopt a state’s standards for reasonableness, wherever a 
state has an effective rate-review program and communicates its find-
ings in a manner directed by HHS.302  This means that the determina-
tions might vary state by state.  To the degree a state’s review program 
is lacking, HHS will review increases above ten percent to determine if 
they are “excessive,” “unjustified,” or “unfairly discriminatory.”303
What is “unreasonable” depends in part on why rates are increas-
ing.  The proposed rule defines a rate increase as excessive if it “causes 
the premium charged for the health insurance coverage to be unrea-
sonably high in relation to the benefits provided under the cover-
age.”
 
304
 
301 Id. sec. 1003, § 2794(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-94(a)(1); see also Rate Increase 
Disclosure and Review, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,004, 81,005 (Dec. 23, 2010) (describing sec-
tion 1003). 
  This means that regulators will have to look at the benefits to 
see if they warrant concomitant rate increases.  If regulators interpret 
what is unreasonable from a Health Promotion perspective, any in-
creases that do not mirror growth in health-promoting coverage might 
be unreasonable.  Under a Financial Security approach, the test of rea-
son might be based upon how much the premiums increased in com-
parison to inflation or wage growth to gauge how much the premium 
growth could further eat into family disposable income.  Under Brute 
Luck scrutiny, premium increases might be unreasonable if they result 
from greater coverage of avoidable harms (or from the increased costs 
of covering those avoidable harms already within policies).  Other fac-
tors will of course inform reasonableness as well, including the sheer 
percentage of the increase and the rates prior to the increase.  But a de-
302 Rate Increase Disclosure and Review, supra note 301, at 81,007, 81,027 (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 154). 
303 Id. at 81,026 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 154). 
304 Id. at 81,027 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 154). 
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termination of whether the increase is valuable will in large part turn on 
what uses of premium dollars regulators determine are worthwhile. 
C.  Challenges of Prioritization 
Finally, sometimes regulators will have to make decisions where 
they are not actively choosing a particular conception of insurance in 
defining or evaluating a policy, but rather where their decisions will 
(either intentionally or not) determine the expansion or contraction 
of resources for policies that favor a particular conception.  An early 
example arose in defining regulatory specifications for the “medical 
loss ratio” requirement.305  PPACA requires that insurance plans 
spend eighty to eighty-five percent of premium dollars on “reim-
bursement for clinical services” or “for activities that improve health 
care quality.”306  The HHS Secretary, under advisement from the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), was tasked 
with defining what activities “improve health care quality,” including 
those designed to “[i]ncrease the likelihood of desired health out-
comes” in measureable ways.307
The interpretation of what is designed to promote desired health 
outcomes effectively validates and perpetuates investments by insurers 
in particular types of Health Promotion spending.  In its letter advo-
cating for a broad definition of what it means to improve health care 
quality, America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), the lobby for pri-
vate insurance companies, wrote that a too narrow or static definition 
was risky:  “This would take us off the course of creating a 21st century 
health care system and create new barriers to investment in the many 
activities that health plans have implemented for the primary purpose 
of improving health care quality.”
 
308
 
305 PPACA secs. 1001, 10101, § 2718(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A). 
  Although AHIP’s motivations 
may not have been as selfless as its words suggest, its statement reflects 
what is at stake with the regulation—the definition of how broadly 
306 Id. 
307 Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Require-
ments Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,864, 
74,924 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158) [hereinafter Health Insur-
ance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements].   
308 Letter from Jeffrey L. Gabardi, Senior Vice President, America’s Health Insur-
ance Plans to Mr. Donald B. Moulds, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Planning and Evalua-
tion, Office of the Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. 3 (May 14, 2010), 
 available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20100613_AHIP%20MLR%20letter%20(5-
14-10)_FINAL.pdf. 
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regulators encourage investment in activities that offer potential to 
improve health. 
The HHS Secretary issued an interim final rule in December 
2010, adopting language proposed by the NAIC.309  This rule cast a 
wide net around activities that are considered potentially health pro-
moting.  Activities that improve health care quality were defined to in-
clude “care coordination, chronic disease management,” and activities 
“[i]dentifying and addressing ethnic, cultural or racial disparities in 
effectiveness of identified best clinical practices and evidence based 
medicine.”310  Several intensive services, such as “[p]ersonalized post-
discharge reinforcement and counseling by an appropriate health 
care professional” and “[c]oaching programs designed to educate in-
dividuals on clinically effective methods for dealing with a specific 
chronic disease or condition” are also included.311  The few limitations 
include that activities must “[b]e directed toward individual enrollees 
or incurred for the benefit of specified segments of enrollees.”312  In 
addition, wellness-program administrative costs are excluded,313 as are 
activities “designed primarily to control or contain costs.”314
What are the implications of this broad definition?  First, it validates 
a Health Promotion vision of insurance.  By including such activities 
that support Health Promotion values in the numerator of the medical 
loss ratio, the Secretary creates incentives for insurers to invest in a wide 
range of activities that may have potential to maintain or improve 
health.  Second, in doing so, the Secretary de facto prioritizes the 
Health Promotion vision over others.  The rule’s regulatory impact 
analysis recognizes that “increases in quality-improving activities or in 
consumption of medical care . . . have some benefit to enrollees but 
they also represent an additional cost to issuers and society.”
 
315
 
309 Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Require-
ments, supra note 
  Thus, 
more dollars will be spent on those activities central to a Health Promo-
tion conception of insurance (but not to the others, especially consider-
ing that wellness-program administrative costs are excluded from the 
numerator) in a way that is likely to increase insurance premiums.  In 
307.   
310 Id. at 74,924.   
311 Id.   
312 Id.  
313 Id.  
314 Id.  
315 Id. at 74,895.  
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effect, the medical-loss regulations increase the share of insurance dol-
lars allocated to a Health Promotion conception of insurance. 
These examples illustrate a small sample of the instances in which 
regulators have already begun to make decisions that support a par-
ticular understanding of what insurance should do and to what de-
gree.  Many more such cases will undoubtedly arise over the coming 
years.  Understanding the deep, normative interests that these types of 
decisions implicate could help regulators to make such decisions in 
more informed and thoughtful ways, as well as to anticipate likely ob-
jections to their regulatory choices. 
CONCLUSION:  THE FUTURE OF CONCEPTUAL PLURALISM  
AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
PPACA captured three distinct American conceptions of health 
insurance by simultaneously pursuing policies that reflect the values of 
each.  Understanding these three conceptions of insurance and how 
they are reflected in PPACA’s policies makes it clearer what is at stake 
in the implementation of health care reform.  Each of these concep-
tions envisions that PPACA’s expansion of insurance will solve a 
somewhat different problem by collectivizing risks.  A Health Promo-
tion vision of health insurance first and foremost anticipates that in-
surance reform will make Americans healthier, mitigating the risk that 
inefficient or unjustly inequitable access to medical care will compro-
mise Americans’ health.  In contrast, a Financial Security vision ex-
pects insurance reform to address concerns with medical bankruptcies 
and health care costs rising out of pace with what Americans can af-
ford; expanded health insurance should ensure financial security by 
prioritizing indemnification of costs that cause an insured real threat 
of financial insecurity.  Finally, a Brute Luck approach expects insur-
ance reform to address two problems:  Americans’ vulnerability to un-
avoidable health harms and, on the flip side, the failure of Americans 
to take reasonable responsibility for self-care where possible.  To solve 
these problems, health insurance reform would ideally advance health 
justice and increase personal responsibility by prioritizing coverage 
for, and distributing the costs of, unavoidable, brute-luck harms.  At 
the core of each theory are principles for rationing the use of insur-
ance-premium dollars.  Each deems certain types of harms more wor-
thy of solidaristic treatment, as Americans more evenly share risks with 
others in their risk pool, and taxpayers at large share the costs of 
harms for those receiving subsidies for insurance.  The case for 
reform is neither clear nor simple. 
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I had initially called this Article “The Theoretical Incoherence of 
PPACA.”  But this title would have implied that conceptual pluralism 
is undesirable and that we should strive to achieve theoretical cohe-
rence, choosing only one among these ideas.  It is not apparent, how-
ever, that conceptual pluralism should be eliminated. 
It clearly creates challenges.  It makes implementation more com-
plex—requiring frequent mediation of conflicts and tradeoffs that 
arise from policies rooted deeply in distinct normative visions.  The 
conceptual complexity of the law may also contribute to Americans’ 
apparent confusion with respect to reform.  Americans are ambivalent 
about the law.316  Although there are many reasons why people dislike 
or feel ambivalent about health reform, there is reason to believe that 
complexity is a contributing factor.  It is apparent that Americans do 
not understand the reform.317  President Obama has struggled to dis-
till the benefits of the law into compelling sound bites.318
 
316 See Lydia Saad, By Slim Margin, Americans Support Healthcare Bill’s Passage, GALLUP 
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/126929/slim-margin-americans-support-
healthcare-bill-passage.aspx (finding forty-nine percent of Americans in support of the 
law following passage); see also Kaiser Health Tracking Poll—September 2010, HENRY J. KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/8104.cfm (noting that 
“the public remains divided on the new law”); Kaiser Health Tracking Poll—December 2010, 
HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/8127.cfm 
(showing that even by the end of 2010, “the latest tracking poll shows the public still di-
vided in their views of the health reform law” ).  
  And few 
people—even educated physicians and academics in the field—truly 
317 While polling numbers have fluctuated regarding the percent of Americans 
who support the reform, they have been consistently high on the number who do not 
understand it.  See Poll:  Most Don’t Understand Health Care Changes, CBSNEWS.COM 
(Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/22/politics/main6890653. 
shtml  (“Six months after President Barack Obama signed landmark legislation that 
will extend health care coverage to millions of people, Americans still do not really 
know what the law does.”); see also Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Trevor Tompson, AP 
Poll:  Health Care Law Making Us Muddle-Minded, ABCNEWS, Sept. 22, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=11693092 (noting, for example, that 
“[m]any who wanted the health care system to be overhauled don’t realize that some 
provisions they cared about actually did make it in”).    
318 See Alonso-Zaldivar & Tompson, supra note 317 (“The uncertainty and confu-
sion amount to a dismal verdict for the Obama administration’s campaign to win over 
public opinion.”); Sara Kliff & Carrie Budoff Brown, Voters Not Budging on Health Care, 
POLITICO ( Jan. 19, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/ 
47801.html (“Despite the millions spent on advertising, countless town halls and a 
reinvigorated debate over the new health law, neither party has accomplished the key 
goal:  swaying public opinion on health reform.”); see also Sarah Kliff, Obama’s Health 
Care Hard Sell, POLITICO (Aug. 10, 2010, 4:29 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/ 
stories/0810/40835.html (discussing the administration’s challenge in “persuading 
seniors that the health care law is a good deal for them”).   
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understand what the law intends to do.319
It is also likely that many people can identify some pieces of the 
pluralistic law that they support and others that they do not.  For ex-
ample, a Financial Security advocate might support the Medicaid ex-
pansion, subsidies, and prohibition of policy limits, and at the same 
time believe that the first-dollar coverage of preventive care is a waste.  
By deferring the opportunity to prioritize a particular normative con-
ception of American health insurance, the reform may leave Ameri-
cans confused and ambivalent about what insurance and insurance 
reform intend to (and perhaps should) accomplish.
  If the goal of the reform were 
singularly, for example, that no American would ever again suffer un-
due financial distress due to medical care expenses, Americans could 
understand this goal, judge it, and assess its success over time. 
320
Yet conceptual clarity would also come at a cost.  It may be that 
the most effective, stable, or popular policy results when all three con-
ceptions are in balance.  The conceptual pluralism underlying the 
policies of PPACA may accurately mirror the desires of a heterogene-
ous population.  In this case, the ideal regulatory approach would be 
to order and prioritize these conceptions thoughtfully, but not neces-
sarily to choose one and eliminate others.  Tethering the reform too 
strongly to any one of the three theories would have made the reform 
more vulnerable to attack by those who would prioritize a neglected 
theory.  If Americans are deeply divided and unmovable in their views 
of what insurance should accomplish, it is critical to maintain a plura-
listic policy in order to appeal to a democratic majority.  The real chal-
lenge of sustainable health insurance policy then would not be to root 
out the best approach, but rather to manage tensions among the 
three when they inevitably arise. 
 
Alternatively, conceptual pluralism may serve as a kind of legisla-
tive experiment, setting up a structure where three different ideas are 
 
319 See John Leland, Doctors Hear Many Questions About Health Law.  Answers Are in 
Shorter Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2010, at A12 (“After months of public wrangling and 
brinksmanship in Washington, the nation’s doctors now find themselves having to an-
swer questions about a 2,400-page law that many do not understand themselves, and 
which they may have opposed.”). 
320 Tom Baker writes about the ability of insurance to help shape notions of re-
sponsibility with respect to risk.  See Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and the Social Construc-
tion of Responsibility, in EMBRACING RISK, supra note 74, at 33.  As a corollary, if insur-
ance implies several models of responsibility, it could fuel ambivalence regarding what 
we should expect insurance to do.   
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simultaneously road-tested for effectiveness and popularity.321
For now, we cannot be sure which of these futures will emerge.  
Assuming the health reform survives constitutionality challenges 
(which one might interpret as resistance to the creation of more soli-
daristic health insurance markets in the first place), the defining fea-
tures of American health insurance (whether pluralistic or not) will 
become clearer over time.  The implementers of PPACA hold great 
power to shape future conceptions of insurance.  The decisions regu-
lators make either to prioritize one vision of health insurance or to 
hold multiple visions in balance will influence the future role of 
American health insurance and, in turn, shape what Americans expect 
from insurance in the future. 
  One 
model might become more popular over time.  Or one model might 
prove easier than the others to implement successfully.  For example, 
as medical research advances, comparative effectiveness research could 
unlock the door to an unimaginably efficient, cost-effective system of 
insurance.  If so, regulators could prioritize Health Promotion goals 
going forward and decide to turn to other tools, such as bankruptcy-
law reform or expanded government welfare programs, to address Fi-
nancial Security concerns that are neglected by health insurance.  In 
contrast, it could play out, for example, that PPACA’s Health Promo-
tion goals prove too expensive or too difficult to implement through 
insurance and that the Financial Security goals are more straightfor-
ward, or perhaps more valued by Americans.  In such a case, policy-
makers could scale back insurance spending on, for example, preven-
tive care to increase funding for the parts of the law that provide 
financial security, such as sliding-scale subsidies and the Medicaid ex-
pansion.  Finally, if medical care costs continue to grow exponentially, 
greater future attention will likely focus on Brute Luck approaches that 
limit coverage to promote individual risk avoidance and attempt to 
contain costs.  In such a case, while insurance might still seek to pro-
mote health and financial security, it might do so only with respect to 
medical care needs resulting from unavoidable harms. 
This Article has offered a framework to enable greater awareness 
of the multiple conceptions of insurance at play to provide a new lens 
through which to understand and evaluate this evolution. 
 
 
321 See generally Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283 (1998) (describing democratic experimen-
talism as a form of government that “leave[s] room for experimental elaboration and 
revision to accommodate varied and changing circumstances”).  
